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The Legal Advice Requirement of
the Attorney-Client Privilege: A
Special Problem for In-House
Counsel and Outside Attorneys
Representing Corporations
by Grace M. Gieser
In practice, however, advice does not spring from lawyers' heads as
Athena did from the brow of Zeus. Inevitably, attorneys' opinions
reflect an accumulation of education and experience in the law and the
large society law serves. In a given case, advice prompted by the
client's disclosures may be further and inseparably informed by other
knowledge and encounters.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

The attorney-client privilege protects certain communications between
attorney and client from compelled disclosure. The privilege applies to
clients who are individuals as well as to corporate clients.2 The lawyers
providing legal services to corporations may be outside attorneys who are
employees of law firms. Many corporations, however, rely on in-house
attorneys for many, if not all, of their legal needs.' Often, in-house

* Professor of Law, University of Louisville School of Law. Yale University (B.A.,
1982); Emory University School of Law (J.D., 1985).
1. In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Judge Ginsburg writing for the
court).
2. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (clarifying that the privilege
applies to corporations).
3. In-house law departments are often bigger than most firms. For example, in 1996
General Electric had 507 in-house attorneys while Exxon had 430. Some insurance
companies had more in-house attorneys. See The 1996 CorporateLegal Times 200 Largest

1169

1170

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

attorneys have official responsibilities that involve them in the
management of the company. Even if the attorneys do not have official
nonlegal responsibilities, the corporation may seek the opinion of inhouse attorneys with regard to all sorts of issues, some of which may be
clearly legal issues, some of which may be clearly business issues, and
some that are a jumble of both.' Even outside attorneys sometimes hold

Legal Departments,CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 1996, at 1. Since the 1960s in-house law

departments have increased in size. See Carol Kleiman, In-House Lawyers Making a
Comeback, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 31, 1991, § 8, at 1 (Kemper had 86 attorneys in 1985 and 141

in 1991). See also Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, CorporateCounsel and the Elite
Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REv. 277, 277 (1985); J. Randolph Ayre, In-House-Better Than
Ever, NAT'L L. J., Feb. 15, 1982, at 11; Harry N. Turk, The Rise of Corporate Law
Departments: Pressureon Both In-House and Outside Counsel, 10 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 551
(1984). In addition, in-house responsibilities have broadened. See, e.g., Angela Ward,
Turner Broadcasting'sKorn Tuned in to Growth Company's Rapid ExpansionKeeps Legal
DepartmentBusy, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 1994, at 16 [hereinafter TurnerBroadcasting]
(goal of general counsel is to keep all but "very small things" in-house; in-house attorneys
papering complex acquisitions); Angela Ward, Sprint General Counsel Finds Utopia in
Kansas City, Missouri, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 1994, at 13 (in-house attorneys do
everything and are integrally involved in anything sent to an outside attorney); Henry W.
Ewalt & Glen D. Nager, Co-Counseling with Outside Counsel Works for Westinghouse,
CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 1994, at 35 (in-house attorneys paired with outside counsel in
litigation; in-house attorneys participate at trial); Audrey Duff, ChiquitaFlies Solo in Stock
Sale, AM. LAW., Mar. 1991, at 46 (in-house attorneys handle antitrust matters, international trade issues, corporate securities matters, real estate, admiralty, employment matters,
and government relations); Alison Frankel, J.C. Penney's Inside Out Litigation, AM. LAW.,
Sept. 1992, at 42-43 (in-house attorneys actively participate in litigation matters).
4. See, e.g., Bruce T. Rubenstein, Bringinga BroaderBusiness Perspective to the Job
of GeneralCounsel, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, July 1996, at 7 (general counsel is also a member
of "The Group of Corporate Officers" that participates in strategic planning); Angela Ward,
Only Happy Problemsfor Platinum'sGeneral Counsel, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 1994, at
14 (general counsel is also Chief Operating Officer); Bruce Rubenstein, Hyatt General
Counsel Adds Vice President-Development to Title, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 1994, at 4
(general counsel also Vice President of Development). See also In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d
94, 96 (D. C. Cir. 1984) (vice president was general counsel); Fine v. Facet Aerospace Prods.
Co., 133 F.R.D. 439, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (general counsel was assistant secretary of
corporation); Henson v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 118 F.R.D. 584, 587 (W.D. Va. 1987) (in-house
counsel and secretary of corporation); Cooper-Rutter Assocs., Inc. v. Anchor Natl Life Ins.
Co., 563 N.Y.S.2d 491, 492 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (in-house counsel was also corporate
secretary).
5. See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting,supra note 3, at 16. The general counsel of Turner
Broadcasting stated that the in-house counsel department "is fully integrated into the daily
operations of the company." Id. In-house attorneys "become very much a part of the
management teams of each of the subsidiaries. We try to get them involved in the building
stages so they understand the history of the development, before there's an explicit need
for the lawyer's services." Id.
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positions within the management of corporations. 6 Likewise, corpora-

tions may consult outside attorneys, whether or not they have management responsibility, not only with regard to legal issues but also
business issues or issues involving a mix of business and legal consider-

ations.7
While the legal profession should perhaps cheer this evolution of roles

and duties, the application of the attorney-client privilege in the
corporate representation environment creates problems because the
tradition of the privilege requires that it apply only to a communication
involving a lawyer in his or her professional legal capacity and only if
the communication relates to obtaining or rendering legal advice,
services, or assistance. Courts have not agreed in defining the kinds of
services rendered by attorneys that the privilege protects.8 Nor have
courts acted consistently and uniformly in dealing with communications
containing a mix of advice, service, and assistance.' The resulting
confusion in this area of privilege law has proved to be fertile ground for
some courts' reliance upon antiquated notions about what attorneys do
and particularly what attorneys, inside and out, do for corporate
clients.1" Some courts have exhibited significant bias against corporations and particularly against in-house counsel, relying on assumptions
based on status and supposed probabilities." The resultant uncertainty of whether the privilege applies in particular corporate settings
threatens the privilege's ability to create the positive impact of client

6. See, e.g., David Rubenstein, Both Sides Like the Hybrid Legal Departmentat Alamo
or Is There Only One Side?, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, July 1993, at 18 (general counsel/corporate
secretary was outside law firm attorney). See also Great Plains Mutual Ins. Co. v. Mutual
Reinsurance Bureau, 150 F.R.D. 193 (D. Kan. 1993) (outside attorney was on the board of
directors and also served as legal advisor); SEC v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 518 F.
Supp. 675, 678 (D.D.C. 1981) (outside attorney was general counsel, director, secretary of
the corporation, and a member of pension committee); In re Rospatch Sec. Litig., 1991 WL
574963, at 1 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (outside attorney served as director). The practice of legal
counsel serving as a director raises ethical questions because it creates a plethora of
conflicts potentialities. See generallyCraig C. Albert, The Lawyer-Director:An Oxymoron?,
9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 413 (1996).
7. The principal of an association of attorneys with in-house expertise stated, "[It is
typical for us to be asked for our business view of issues as well as our legal view." Bruce
Rubenstein, Independents: No Associates,No Staff, No $300-an-HourBillers, CORP. LEGAL
TIMES, Dec. 1995, at 28. A managing partner of a group of attorneys who are former
partners or associates at large firms stated that the clients "use us for practical advice too."
Id.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. See infra Part TV.
11. See infra Part V.
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disclosure and, therefore, a positive impact on the justice system, the
raison d'etre of the privilege.
At least since the time of Jeremy Bentham, a debate has raged about
the benefits and burdens of the attorney-client privilege. 12 Proponents
of the privilege argue that the privilege must protect communications so
clients will make full disclosure to their attorneys, and the attorneys, as
a result of the complete disclosure, can render the best possible
representation. Thus, society benefits by a superior administration of
justice. In addition, full disclosure by clients in decision-making stages
creates an environment of more law abidance because lawyers, aware of
issues at an early stage, practice preventive law. Lesser, occasional
arguments are that the privilege protects privacy interests of the clients,
the autonomy of the clients, and the clients' belief in the fairness of the
United States system of justice. The proponents of the privilege argue
that these benefits outweigh any possible burden. Critics doubt the
benefits and argue that the burden of subversion of truth, inherent in
any application of the attorney-client privilege, outweighs any possible
benefit, especially when the client is a corporation."8 A few scholars
have attempted empirical studies to document the effect of the attorneyclient privilege, but the scant data has significant faults, and is at best
equivocal on the issue of whether the privilege in fact encourages candor
of clients.14
This Article does not seek to enter into the debate about the benefits
of the attorney-client privilege and the burdens which may accompany
it. Rather, this Article accepts the fact that all United States jurisdictions have honored the attorney-client privilege throughout their history
and continue to do so, even in light of the ongoing debate. Courts have
applied the privilege uniformly to corporations as well."5 This universal acceptance of the privilege by courts and legislatures of the various
jurisdictions evidences a shared belief that the privilege's primary
modem justification or goal is valid-that the law should encourage
clients to deal with their counsel with complete candor so that superior
representation can occur, that the superior representation can take
justice to an elevated plane, and that the attorney-client privilege can
act as the catalyst for the result of client candor. As United States
District Judge Wyzanski stated in United States v. United Shoe
12. Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence (1827), in 7 THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 473 (Bowring ed. 1842), quoted in 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 2291, at 549-51 (John T. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)
[hereinafter WiGMORE].

13. See infra Part 1I(A) for a discussion of the policy debate.
14. See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
15. See infra Part II(B).
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Machinery Corp.,"e "'[the social good derived from the proper performance of the functions of lawyers acting for their clients is believed to
outweigh the harm that may come from the suppression of the evidence
in specific cases.'"' 7
Assuming, as jurisdictions evidently do, that applying the attorneyclient privilege creates such benefits, the certainty of the parameters of
the privilege is critical. For the privilege to encourage client disclosure
to counsel, a high degree of certainty must exist that the privilege will
protect what the client says from disclosure in the event litigation
ensues. If a client doubts at the time for disclosure that a court will
protect the communication in the long run, disclosure in the short run
may not occur. Thus, the efficacy of the privilege as an encourager of
candor diminishes.18
Many aspects of the corporate attorney-client privilege create
uncertainty.' s Yet, the courts' inconsistent application of the requirement that the communication relate to the obtaining or rendering of
legal advice, service, or assistance, and the related professional legal
capacity requirement, creates substantial uncertainty in the application
of the attorney-client privilege. The uncertainty causes slippage in the

16. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
17. Id. at 358 (quoting MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 210, cmt.).
18. See also infra discussion in Part II(C).
19. Jurisdictions apply varying tests in determining who speaks for the corporation for
purposes of the attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.
383 (1981) (the federal common law approach); Southern Bell Tel. & Telegraph v. Deason,
632 So. 2d 1377 (Fla. 1994) (Florida's approach). See generally JOHN WILLIAM GERGACZ,
ArORNEY-CORPORATE CLIENT PRmLEGE 13.02[3) (2d. ed. 1990 & Supp. 1996) (discussing
all approaches and jurisdictional differences); John E. Sexton,A Post-Upjohn Consideration
ofthe CorporateAttorney-ClientPrivilege,57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443 (1982) (focusing on Upjohn
as the federal common law test); Michael L. Waldman, Beyond Upjohn: The Attorney-Client
Privilege in the Corporate Context, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 473 (1987) (focusing on
Upjohn).
Often corporate activities touch many states and sometimes many nations.
A
corporation may not be able to determine at the time of the communication which
jurisdiction's version of the attorney-client privilege will apply. Thus, a corporation may
not know which test that a court will apply and will not know whether the privilege will
apply.
Uncertainty of application for corporations may spring from the confidentiality
requirement or waiver standards. At the time of the communication, the corporation
cannot know that the communication will be inadvertently disclosed. In some jurisdictions,
inadvertent disclosure waives the privilege which otherwise attached. For a discussion of
the inadvertent disclosure issue, see Roberta M. Harding, Waiver: A Comprehensive
Analysis ofa Consequenceof InadvertentlyProducingDocuments Protectedby the AttorneyClient Privilege,42 CATH. U. L. REV. 465 (1993). For a discussion of sources of uncertainty
in general, see Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy: The Mythology of the
CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157, 168-71 (1993).
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connection between the privilege and the goals society expects the
privilege to achieve.
Ironically, courts' desire to confine the privilege to narrow parameters2' causes much of this confusion, inconsistency and uncertainty.
With regard to corporations in general, and in-house counsel in
particular, this desire to police the privilege has led some courts
basically to re-evaluate the policy arguments for and against the
privilege's application. These courts use the issues that are a part of the
policy discussion as guides to application of the privilege in individual
cases.1 In doing so, courts' decisions often seem motivated by assumptions, fears, and probabilities suggested by the policy discussion, but
unsupported by the facts of the individual cases.
From this point of recognition of the uncertainty obvious in this area
of privilege law, two possible paths emerge. One can argue that the
attorney-client privilege, especially as it relates to corporate representation, with this legal advice slippage, does not work as an encourager of
client candor; thus, courts and legislatures should abolish it. 22 Alternatively, one can argue that the courts' application of the privilege must
improve so that it will be more likely to succeed in creating an environment for client candor. This Article follows the latter path, arguing that
courts must define more flexibly the legal advice, service, or assistance
requirement, so that the definition can mesh with what corporate
lawyers, inside and outside, do in the ever-changing legal profession. In
addition, courts must apply the requirement more consistently. The
related professional legal capacity requirement should not receive
separate analysis. Courts should determine whether the privilege
applies and how it applies free of assumptions about corporate represen-

20. Many courts explicitly note that they seek to construe the privilege narrowly. See,
e.g., Allendale Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 152 F.R.D. 132, 135 (N.D. Ill. 1993);

Great Plains Mutual Ins. Co. v. Mutual Reinsurance Bureau, 150 F.R.D. 193, 196 (D. Kan.
1993); Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc, 143 F.R.D. 611, 615 (E.D.N.C. 1992);
Teltron, Inc. v. Alexander, 132 F.R.D. 394, 395-96 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
21. In United States v. Rowe, 96 F.3d 1294 (9th Cir. 1996), Judge Kozinski, writing for

the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, appeared to recognize that once
a court decided that the privilege applied to corporations or in-house attorneys, the

usefulness of the policy arguments ended. The court stated:
We are not unmindful that the attorney-client privilege, like all privileges, can
impede fact-finding ....
Nor are we unaware of academic criticism that the
privilege allegedly gives unjustified protection to entrenched interests ....
Nonetheless, we have no doubt that, under existing caselaw, the activities here
meet the "attorney-client" and "professional legal services" requirements for the
privilege.

Id. at 1297.
22. For just such an argument, see Thornburg, supra note 19, at 159.
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tation that the facts of the individual cases before the courts do not
evidence. Finally, courts must eliminate the anticorporation and anti-inhouse counsel bias which is obvious in many courts' opinions, and which
easily exists in the present confusion. Having accepted the balance
struck by agreeing that the privilege applies to corporations and to inhouse attorneys, courts should not subvert the effectiveness of the
privilege by attempting to reset the balance in individual cases or by
making status-based decisions. The increased certainty gained should
result in the privilege as a more effective encourager of client candor in
all situations.
Part II of this Article discusses the rationale of the privilege, the
courts' acceptance of the privilege and the importance of certainty to the
societal goals of the privilege. Part III explains the requirements of the
privilege. Part IV critiques the professional legal capacity and legal
advice requirements as applied by courts, especially as applied to
corporations in the 1980s and 1990s. Part V discusses anticorporation
and anti-in-house bias present in many decisions. Part VI concludes
that the improvements suggested in this Article enhance the certainty
of application of the attorney-client privilege for client corporations, and
thus should enhance the achievement of the goal of the privilege
recognized by courts today--encouragement of client candor.
II.

BACKGROUND OF THE ArrORNEY-CLIENT PRMLEGE

Rationale for the Attorney-Client Privilege
For centuries the courts have recognized the attorney-client privilege
as a privilege of clients.23 The primary stated rationale has been
utilitarian.24 Clients must fully disclose matters to their attorneys so

A.

23. PAUL R. RICE, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 1:3, at
9 (ed. 1993 & Supp. 1995); JOHN WILLIAM STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 92, at 339
(Practitioner Treatise Series 4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter MCCORMICKJ; 8 WIGMORE, supra
note 12, § 2290, at 545. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 118 cmt. c. (Proposed Final Draft, March 29, 1996) (modern privilege is the client's
privilege) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
For a discussion of the history of the privilege, see RICE, supra, § 1:2, at 6-8; WIGMORE,
supra note 12, § 2290; James A. Gardner, A Re-Evaluation of the Attorney-Client Privilege
(Part1), 8 VILL. L. REV. 279 (1963); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A Historical Perspectiveon
the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1062 (1978); Max Radin, The Privilege of
Confidential Communications Between Lawyer and Client, 16 CALIF. L. REV, 487 (1928).
24, See McCORMICK, supra note 23, § 72, at 270; CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD
C. KIRKPATRICK, 2 FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 181, at 302-03 (1994) [hereinafter MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK]; 8 WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2291; Stephen A. Saltzburg, Communications
Falling within the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 IOWA L. REV. 811, 817 (1981). See also
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that the attorneys can adequately and beneficially represent those
clients.'5 Three assumptions form the basis of this rationale: the

RICE, supra note 23, § 2:3, at 52 ("The purpose of the privilege in the United States has
always been to encourage people to seek legal advice freely and to communicate candidly
with the attorney during those consultations."); Note, Attorney-Client and Work Product
Protectionin a UtilitarianWorld: An Argument for Recomparison, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1697,
1703 (1995) (arguing that though the situation may have been different in the past, the
modern rationale is utilitarian).
25. Attorneys in the United States have an ethical duty to keep client matters
confidential. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1996) [hereinafter
MODEL RULES]; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1983)
[hereinafter MODEL CODE]. This duty is not only the creature of ethical rules, but also has
roots in the fiduciary nature of the relationship of attorney and client, and in agency
concepts. For a discussion of the confidentiality principle as a creature of legal ethics, see
Nancy J. Moore, Limits to Attorney-Client Confidentiality: A "PhilosophicallyInfbrmed"
and Comparative Approach to Legal and Medical Ethics, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 177
(1985); L. Ray Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lawyer'sDuty of Loyalty, 29 EMORY L.J. 909
(1980); Lee A. Pizzimenti, The Lawyer's Duty to Warn Clients About Limits on Confidentiality, 39 CATH. U. L. REv. 441 (1990); Fred C. Zacharias, RethinkingConfidentiality, 74 IOWA
L. REV. 351 (1989).

For a discussion of fiduciary principles, see Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An
Analysis of FiduciaryObligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879; Robert Flannigan, The Fiduciary
Obligation, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 285 (1989); Tamar Frankel, FiduciaryLaw, 71 CAL.
L. REV. 795 (1983); Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle,37 CAL. L. REV. 539 (1949).
No one disagrees with the notion that attorneys are fiduciaries. See CHARLES W.
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 4.1, at 146-47 (1986); DeMott, supra at 908;
Flannigan, supra at 293-94; Scott, supra at 541. See also Zeiden v. Oliphant, 54 N.Y.S.2d
27 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1945) (discussing attorney's duty of confidentiality as derived from the
attorney's role as a fiduciary).
In some situations, attorneys are also agents, See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 1, 395 (1958). The duty of confidentiality as derived from fiduciary law and agency law
may not be as broad as the principle stated in Model Rule 1.6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 395 cmt. f (1958).
Although each state crafts its own ethical precepts governing attorneys, many states
follow, at least in part, Model Rule 1.6 of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. MODEL RULES Rule 1.6. The American Bar Association first adopted
the Model Rules in 1983. Model Rule 1.6 requires that an attorney not reveal "information
relating to representation of a client" without informed client consent. MODEL RULES Rule
1.6(a). The Rule allows but does not require disclosure if the lawyer reasonably believes
it necessary to prevent the client from "committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes
is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm," to "establish a claim or
defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client," in a
matter involving the client, to "establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim
against the lawyer," and to "respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the
lawyer's representation of the client." MODEL RULES Rule 1.6(b).
Some states use Model Rule 1.6 unchanged. See, e.g., ALA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1995); DEL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1996); KY.

SUPR. CT. Rule 3.130 (1.6) (1996). Many states have a modified version of Model Rule 1.6.
See, eg., CONN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1996) (allows attorney
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disclosure in a wider array of circumstances, including situations of financial injury to
another); MD. LAWYER'S RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 1.6 (1996) (allows attorney

disclosure in a wider array of circumstances).
States following the older Model Code of Professional Responsibility require a similar
duty. See MODEL CODE DR 4-101. The American Bar Association adopted the Model Code
in 1969. For a discussion of the duty under the Model Code, see Roy M. Sobelson, Lawyers,
Clients and Assurances of Confidentiality: Lawyers Talking without Speaking, Clients
Hearing without Listening, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 703 (1988). For an example of a Model
Code approach, see GA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBiLITY DR 4-101(1996). For yet
another approach to the confidentiality duty, see RESTATEMENT, supra note 23. at §§ 11112.
A primary justification for the duty of confidentiality is that it encourages clients to fully
disclose matters to their counsel so that counsel can render superior advice and further
justice. Comment two to Model Rule 1.6 states, "The observance of the ethical obligation
of a lawyer to hold inviolate confidential information of the client not only facilitates the
full development of facts essential to proper representation of the client but also encourages
people to seek early legal assistance." MODEL RULES Rule 1.6 cmt. 2. Comment four states
that "a] fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that the lawyer
maintain confidentiality of information relating to the representation. The client is thereby
encouraged to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or
legally damaging subject matter." MODEL RULES Rule 1.6 cmt. 4. Some commentators
have noted that the duty of confidentiality has moral underpinnings identical to those of
the attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., Zacharias, supra at 367-68. See generally Charles
Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundationsof the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85
YALE L.J. 1060 (1976).
The broad principle of confidentiality bows, however, in situations where a court requires
attorney testimony.
The attorney-client privilege applies in judicial and other proceedings in which a
lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence
concerning the client. The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in
situations other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through
compulsion of law.
MODEL RULES Rule 1.6 cmt. 5. The attorney-client privilege applies in the setting of
compelled testimony and production, but the privilege is a narrower protection. The duty
of confidentiality protects all information regarding the representation; the attorney-client
privilege protects only attorney-client communications which meet certain, more-limiting
requirements of the privilege. See infra Part III for a discussion of the requirements of the
privilege. Yet, the attorney-client privilege protects against compelling attorney or client
testimony or documents regarding communications within the privilege. The duty of
confidentiality silences only the attorney.
The attorney has the obligation of asserting the evidentiary privilege when appropriate,
but the court ultimately decides to compel or not to compel the testimony of the attorney
or the client, or to require the production of documents or not to require such.
If a lawyer is called as a witness to give testimony concerning a client, absent
waiver by the client, [Rule 1.6] (a) requires the lawyer to invoke the privilege
when it is applicable. The lawyer must comply with the final orders of a court or
other tribunal of competent jurisdiction requiring the lawyer to give information
about the client.
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assumption that clients need to consult lawyers, the assumption that
lawyers need all the facts to adequately deal with clients' matters, and
the assumption that clients would not disclose information without the
privilege's promise of confidentiality.26 Courts have relied upon such
logic for hundreds of years. In 1743 in Annesley v. Anglesea,27 the
English court stated:
No man can conduct any of his affairs which relate to matters of law,
without employing and consulting with an attorney; even if he is
capable of doing it in point of skill, the law will not let him; and if he
does not fully and candidly disclose every thing that is in his mind,
which he apprehends may be in the least relative to the affair he
consults his attorney upon, it will be impossible for the attorney
properly to serve him.2
Courts have continued to accept and rely upon this raison d'etre for the
privilege. For example, in Trammel v. United States,' the United
States Supreme Court stated that "[tihe lawyer-client privilege rests on
the need for the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the
client's reasons for seeking representation if the professional mission is
to be carried out." °

MODEL RULES Rule 1.6 cmt. 20. Therefore, though the ethical duty of confidentiality is

vital in the vast array of possible attorney-client information circumstances, the attorneyclient privilege, only an issue in litigation, is the ultimate arbiter of what a client can view
as confidential in all client disclosure settings.
26. McCORMICK, supra note 23, § 87, at 314-15; JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE MANUAL
18.03[01], at 18-16 (Matthew Bender & Co.
1995); 24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE &

PROCEDURE § 5472, at 80-86 (1986 & Supp. 1996). See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 23,
at § 118 cmt. c.
27. 17 How. St. Tr. 1139 (1743). For a discussion of this case, see Hazard, supra note
23.
28. 17 How. St. Tr. at 1237.
29. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
30. Id. at 51. See also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (purpose is to
"encourage clients to make full disclosure"); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888)
(in the interest of justice that client be "free from... apprehension of disclosure"); United
States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1498 (2d Cir. 1995) (encourages candor so the attorney is
sufficiently well-informed to provide sound legal advice); In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976,
979 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("The raison d'etre of the hallowed attorney-client privilege is the
protection of a client's communications to counsel so that persons, including organizations
will be induced to consult counsel when needed."). In re Leslie Fay Cos., Inc. Sec. Litig.,
161 F.R.D. 274, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (facilitates openness); United States v. BuitragoDugand, 712 F. Supp. 1045, 1048 (D.P.R. 1989) ("The attorney-client privilege exists to
encourage people to seek legal advice freely and to speak candidly to the attorney without
fear that the communication will be disclosed" (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403)).
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1 the Supreme Court relied upon and
In Upjohn Co. v. United States,"
further developed the utilitarian rationale by focusing on the preventive
law aspects of consultation with lawyers so typical and necessary with
corporate clients. The Court in Upjohn indicated that to encourage
candor between lawyer and client was to encourage the client to consult
with counsel more readily as to how the client should proceed so as to
remain within the bounds of the law"
The disclosure rationale concludes with the notion that the client's full
disclosure ensures superior representation in a retrospective and
prospective manner, and thus the administration of justice benefits. In

Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub,"8 the United

States Supreme Court stated that "the attorney-client privilege serves
the function of promoting full and frank communications between
attorneys and their clients. It thereby encourages observance of the law
and aids in the administration of justice.""4
In addition to utilitarian ideas, deontological justifications have
surfaced.35 One idea is that the clients' privacy interest in attorney
communications justifies the privilege. Another suggestion is that
respect for the clients' autonomy justifies the privilege. A third, less

31.

449 U.S. 383 (1981).

32. Id. at 389. The Court stated that the
purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their
clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or
advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the
lawyer's being fully informed by the client.
Id.
33. 471 U.S. 343 (1985).
34. Id. at 348. See also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Sept. 15, 1983
(Marc Rich & Co. A. G. v. United States), 731 F.2d 1032, 1036 (2d Cir. 1983) (public
benefits from the rendering of sound legal advice); Pacamor Bearings, Inc. v. Minebea Co.,
918 F. Supp. 491, 510 (D.N.H. 1996) (promotes the public interest in the observance of law
and the administration ofjustice); Cuno, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 121 F.R.D. 198, 200 (E.D.N.Y.
1988) (furthers the interests of justice).
35. 24 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 26, § 5472, at 77-79; Albert W. Alschuler, The
Preservation of a Client's Confidences: One Value Among Many or a CategoricalImperative,
52 U. COLO. L. REV. 342, 350 (1981); David W. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and
Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101, 112-13 (1956);
Pizzimenti, supra note 25, at 446; Thornburg, supra note 19, at 182-91; Developments in
the Law: PrivilegedCommunications,98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1501-09 (1985) [hereinafter
Developments]; Note, supra note 24, at 1701-03; Note, The Attorney-ClientPrivilege:Fixed
Rules, Balancing,and ConstitutionalEntitlement, 91 HARV. L. REV. 464, 483 (1977). See
also MCCORMICK, supra note 23, § 87, at 315-16 (identifying it as a new justification as
compared to the utilitarian principle). See generally SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE
ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 119-20 (1982); DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND

JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STuDY 192-97 (1988).
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clear proposition is that the attorney-client privilege is bundled up with
broad ideas of loyalty and fairness. Modern courts have not relied on
these ideas, though surely some courts implicitly consider one or all of
them."6
The privilege has a cost to the extent that it hinders access to truth.
Critics of the privilege note that the privilege, like other exclusionary
rules, keeps relevant evidence out of court so that flawed decisions
result.3 7 Some commentators have attacked this position, arguing that
without the privilege, no information would flow to attorneys. Thus, no
communication of information would exist to be disclosed later in
litigation.38 This reasoning depends, however, on the belief that the
attorney-client privilege encourages disclosure by clients that would not
occur without the privilege.
Others suppose that the cost of the privilege is small, if it exists at all,
because the privilege protects only communications, not the underlying
facts.3 9 Thus, the privilege does not prevent access to the relevant
information, it only hinders access to the communication, and therefore
requires the opposing party to obtain the information by a manner other
than the communication with the attorney.4 0 Some note that even such
a detour creates a significant cost and may, in fact, be not only a detour
but a barrier."'
36.

For a rare example of a court addressing this aspect of the privilege, see United

States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1225 (6th Cir. 1979) (noting that the privilege is based
on the utilitarian concept but also has a privacy aspect), rev'd, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
37. 2 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 24, § 181, at 304-05. With regard to
privileges in general, the McCormick treatise states: "Their effect instead is clearly
inhibitive; rather than facilitating the illumination of truth, they shut out the light."
MCCORMICK, supra note 23, § 72, at 269. See also 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 26,
§ 18.01, at 18-4; Louisell, supra note 35, at 110.
38. For discussions of this suggestion, see RICE, supra note 23, § 2:3, at 56-57; Albert
W. Alschuler, The Searchfor Truth Continued, The PrivilegeRetained:A Response to Judge
Frankel, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 67, 74 (1982); Alschuler, supra note 35, at 350; Stephen A.
Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers and Psychiatrists,66 VA. L. REV. 597,
610-11 (1980); Developments, supra note 35, at 1508. See also Stephen A. Saltzburg,
CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege in ShareholderLitigation and Similar Cases: Garner
Revisited, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 817, 823-24 (1984) ("[N]o tribunal can demonstrate that had
the client been denied a privilege, the additional communications would exist. The
assumption of the privilege is that they would not.").
39. See infra notes 79-80 & accompanying text (discussion of the lack of protection for
the facts).
40. For discussions of this argument, see 24 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 26, § 5472,
at 85-86; Robert Allen Sedler & Joseph J. Simeone, The Realities of Attorney-Client
Confidences, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 9 (1963).
41. See 24 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 26, § 5472, at 85-86; Vincent C. Alexander,
The CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege: A Study of the Participants,63 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
191, 228-31 (1989) (corporate context); Thornburg, supra note 19, at 192-93 (corporate
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Commentators have criticized the attorney-client privilege as applied
to corporations specifically as a situation in which the rationales fail.
These commentators suggest that in the corporate sphere the privilege
does not increase candor,42 and that the burden of undisclosed information is huge in part because alternative avenues to facts in the corporate
environment are costly and corporations and corporate actors have a
Critics argue that deontological
tendency toward evasiveness."
theories do not apply to corporations because ideas of rights peculiar to
individuals form the basis of those theories."
The privilege has been attacked as creating, at best, benefits that are
"all indirect and speculative" and creating the burden of the obfuscation
of the truth which is "plain and concrete."4 5 But little evidence exists
proving the merit or demerit of the privilege in its present form.
Scholars have attempted a few studies. None have produced forceful
results.4 None of the studies measured the true effect of the privilege,

context).
42. See Alexander, supra note 41, at 225-28; William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in
Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1142-43 (1988); Note, supra note 35, at 473-74; Note,
The Lawyer-Client Privilege: Its Application to Corporations,the Role of Ethics, and Its
Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw. U. L. REV. 235, 273 (1961); The Supreme Court, 1980 Term,
95 HARv. L. REV. 91, 270, 276-78 (1981) [hereinafter The Supreme Court]. See generally
David Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations,65 YALE L.J. 952
(1956); Waldman, supra note 19.
43. Alexander, supra note 41, at 228-232; Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege:
Waiver and the Litigator,84 MICH. L. REV. 1605, 1621 (1986); David Simon, supra note 42,
at 955; Thornburg, supra note 19, at 191-205.
44. See GERGACZ, supra note 19, 1.04; 24 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 26, § 5476;
James A. Gardner, A Re-Evaluation of Attorney-Client Privilege (Part11), 8 VILL. L. REV.
447, 498 (1963); Thornburg, supra note 19, at 185-86. But see State ex rel. Great Am. Ins.
Co. v. Smith, 574 S.W.2d 379, 383-85 (Mo. 1978) (en banc).
45. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2291, at 554. See also Marvin E. Frankel, The Search
for Truth Continued: More Disclosure, Less Privilege, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 51 (1982)
(suggesting abolition of the privilege in civil situations).
46. See Zacharias, supra note 25 (reviewing the 1962 Yale study and the late 1980s
Tomkins County, New York study; concluding that these studies were not definitive and
that differing interpretations of the data were possible); Note, FunctionalOverlap Between
the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implicationsfor the Privileged Communications
Doctrine, 71 YALE LJ. 1226, 1236, 1270 (1962) (50.9% of laypeople studied said the
privilege encouraged candor; 72% of attorneys said same). See also Wayne D. Brazil, Civil
Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its PrincipalProblemsand Abuses, 1980 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 789, 822-23 (1979 interviews with Chicago litigators revealed that 132
of 157 said privileges, in general, were rarely the cause of failure to discover relevant
information).
In his study of the corporate privilege, Alexander interviewed corporate in-house and
outside attorneys, business executives, federal judges and magistrates in New York City.
Alexander, supra note 41, at 193. Sixty-two percent of house counsel said that the
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but only dealt with how participants in the legal world felt about the
privilege. Measuring the true effect of the privilege cannot occur. Any
observation of attorney-client dealings would create waiver of privilege
arguments for the observed communications in any later litigation.47
Comparative studies with foreign jurisdictions cannot assist because the
foreign legal systems differ fundamentally from the United States
approach in the privilege area.48
B.

The Acceptance of the Privilege
Even if the privilege hinders access to truth, the acceptance of the
privilege in the United States for individuals and corporations49
indicates a general belief that the benefits created by the privilege
outweigh any possible burdens it creates. As the United States Court

privilege encouraged candor. Eighty-eight and one-half percent of outside counsel said that
the privilege encouraged candor. Seventy-five percent of the executives said that the
privilege encouraged candor. Id. at 254-56. See also Empirical Research Project, Corporate
Legal Ethics-An EmpiricalStudy: The Model Rules, the Code ofProfessionalResponsibility, and Counsel'sContinuing Struggle Between Theory and Practice, 8 J. CORP. L. 601, 622
(1983) (twelve of fifteen business executives said the privilege encouraged candor).
For more discussion of the available data, see RICE, supra note 23, § 2:3, at 55 (no
empirical proof exists); Developments, supra note 35, at 1474-75 (data equivocal); Note,
supra note 24, at 1700-01 (no good data).
47. See Danet, Hoffman & Kermish, Obstaclesto the Study of Lawyer-ClientInteraction:
The Biography of a Failure,14 LAW & SOC'y REv. 905 (1980). See also Louisell, supra note
35, at 111 ("strictly utilitarian bases ... are sometimes highly conjectural and defy
scientific validation").
48. See Carsten R. Eggers & Tobias Trautner, An Exploration of the DifferenceBetween
the American Notion of "Attorney-ClientPrivilege" and the Obligationsof "Professional
Secrecy" in Germany, 7 INT'L L. PRACTICUM 23 (1994); Aubrey Roberts, Legal Professional
Privilege in the UnitedKingdom, 7 INVL L. PRACTICUM 15 (1994); Helena M. Tavares, The
United States Perspective on Travelling with the Attorney-Client Privilege: Checked or
Carry-On Baggage?, 7 INT'L L. PRACTICUM 9 (1994); Alison M. Hill, Note, A Problem of
Privilege: In-House Counsel and the Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States and the
European Community, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INVL L. 145 (1995).
49. All United States jurisdictions have the privilege. The federal privilege is a
creature of common law. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). In the
early 1970s, Proposed Rule of Evidence 503, which defined the attorney-client privilege,
was developed as a federal standard. Though the federal system never adopted the
Proposed Rule, it remains as a helpful definition of the privilege. See 2 WEINSTEIN &
BERGER, supranote 26, at 501(03]. Many states have codified the privilege for purposes
of state law. See, e.g., ALA. RULES OF EVID., Rule 502 (Michie 1995) (clearly applies to
corporations as well as individuals); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-426 (Furse 1995); KY. RULES OF
EVID., Rule 503 (Michie 1996) (applies to individuals and other entities such as
corporations).
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of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated in Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v.

Home Indemnity Co."°:
Privileges forbid the admission of otherwise relevant evidence when
certain interests the privileges are thought to protect are regarded as
more important than the interests served by the resolution of litigation
based on full disclosure of all relevant facts. The [attorney-client]
privilege ...is intended to ensure that a client remains free from

apprehension that consultations with a legal adviser will be disclosed.
The privilege encourages the client to reveal to the lawyer confidences
necessary for the lawyer to provide advice and representation. As the
privilege serves the interests of justice, it is worthy of maximum legal
protection."

In Upjohn Co. v. United States," the United States Supreme Court
expressed its belief in the attorney-client privilege in general, and in the
application of the privilege to corporations. Courts have applied the
attorney-client privilege to corporate clients throughout history.53 The
Court in Upjohn did the same, noting that the parties did not contend
otherwise.' The Court went further, however, expressing approval of
the attorney-client privilege for corporations and expressing belief in the
utilitarian balance struck by the privilege.
Upjohn placed before the Court the issue of who within the corporation
constituted the client for purposes of the privilege. Lower courts had
devised two approaches: the control group test and the subject matter
test." The control group test allowed the privilege to apply to communications otherwise satisfying the privilege requirements if those

50. 32 F.3d 851 (3d Cir. 1994).
51.

Id. at 862 (citations omitted). See also Union Carbide Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 619

F. Supp. 1036, 1046 (D. Del. 1985) ("it has thus been determined that the need to permit
the attorney to provide sound legal advice generally outweighs any disadvantage of
withholding evidence in a particular case"); Magida ex rel Vulcan Detinning Co. v.
Continental Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 74, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (the privilege "is an expression of

policy, sacrificing full disclosure for the considered advantage of untrammeled attorneyclient relations").
52. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
53. See, e.g., LaLance & Grosjean Mfg. Co. v. Haberman Mfg. Co., 87 F. 563, 564
(S.D.N.Y. 1898); United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915);
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 322-23 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 929 (1963). But see Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp.
771 (N.D. Ill.), adheredto, 209 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. Ill.
1962), reu'd, 320 F.2d 314 (1963), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963). See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, at § 123 cmt. b
("Extending the privilege to corporations and other organizations was formerly a matter
of doubt but is no longer questioned.").
54. 449 U.S. at 390.
55. Courts favored the control group test. RICE, supra note 23, § 4:14, at 4-38.
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communications were between individuals in the control group of the
corporation and an attorney. The control group consisted of people who
could control or be significantly involved in the plotting of the corporate
path in response to legal advice.56 This test appealed to courts because
it limited the communications possibly protected by the privilege to a
relatively definable, finite set. The test, therefore, created a degree of
certainty of application and at the same time minimized the application
of the privilege.
The subject matter test directed that the privilege applied if the
communicating employee's superior directed that the communication
occur and the subject matter of the communication fell within the scope
of the employee's duties.57 This test, therefore, allowed the privilege to
apply to communications between an attorney and a larger group of
individual representatives of the corporation. As a result, the test
allowed for a more expansive application of the privilege.

56. See City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.),
mandamus and prohibitiondenied sub nom., General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742
(3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963). See also Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun
Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397 (D. Va. 1975); United States v. I.B.M. Corp. 66
F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). For discussion of the test, see generally Gergacz, supra note
19, 3.02[3][a][i], at 3-61; CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, MODERN
EVIDENCE: DOCTRINE & PRACTICE § 5.16, at 500 (1995) [hereinafter MODERN EVIDENCE];

Glen Weissenberger, Toward Precision in the Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege
for Corporations,65 IOWA L. REV. 899, 908-11 (1980); Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for
CorporateClients: The Control Group Test, 84 HARV. L. REV. 424 (1970).
57. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), affd by an
equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
An employee of a corporation, though not a member of its control group, is
sufficiently identified with the corporation so that his communication to the
corporation's attorney is privileged where the employee makes the communication
at the direction of his superiors in the corporation and where the subject matter
upon which the attorney's advice is sought by the corporation and dealt with in
the communication is the performance by the employee of the duties of his
employment.
Id. at 491-92. See also Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978).
The attorney-client privilege is applicable to an employee's communication if (1)
a communication was made for the purpose of securing legal advice; (2) the
employee making the communication did so at the direction of his corporate
superior; (3) the superior made the request so that the corporation could secure
legal advice; (4) the subject matter of the communication is within the scope of the
employee's corporate duties; (5) the communication is not disseminated beyond
those persons who, because of the corporate structure, need to know its contents.
Id. at 609. See generallyGergacz, supra note 19, 3.0213][a][ii], at 3-64-69; Weissenberger,
supra note 56, at 911-18; Gerald G. Dixon, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege:
Alternatives to the Control Group Test, 12 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 459 (1981).
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The communications at issue in Upjohn were made in the context of
an internal investigation conducted by in-house counsel and outside
attorneys. The attorneys spoke or communicated in writing with
employees not necessarily within the traditional bounds of the corporation's control group. 5 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit decided that the control group test applied and remanded for an
analysis of who might fall within the control group.5 9
The Supreme Court rejected the more privilege-limiting control group
test for purposes of the federal common law.' The Court explained its
rejection of the control group test by noting that that test discouraged
the flow of information to attorneys necessary for legal advice and
therefore undermined the purposes of the attorney-client privilege.61
The Court stated that "the control group test makes it more difficult to
convey full and frank legal advice to the employees who will put into
effect the client corporation's policy."' 2
The Court then noted that the nature of a corporation makes a
broader application of the privilege more appropriate, stating: "In light
of the vast and complicated array of regulatory legislation confronting
the modern corporation, corporations, unlike most individuals, constantly
go to lawyers to find out how to obey the law,' ... particularly since
compliance with the law in this area is hardly an instinctive matter."3
The Supreme Court, adhering to the purposes of the privilege, noted
that the communications in question were necessary for counsel to
properly advise Upjohn as to past and future conduct, otherwise fit
within the parameters of the privilege, were made at the direction of
superiors, were made with knowledge that the communications were for

58. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 387.
59. Id. at 388-89. The Sixth Circuit found the work product doctrine inapplicable. See
United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1228 n.13 (6th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 449 U.S. 383
(1981).
60. 449 U.S. at 389-91. The Court stated:
In the corporate context, ... it will frequently be employees beyond the control
group as defined by the court below... who will possess the information needed
by the corporation's lawyers. Middle-level-and indeed lower-level-employees
can, by actions within the scope of their employment, embroil the corporation in
serious legal difficulties, and it is only natural that these employees would have
the relevant information needed by corporate counsel if he is adequately to advise
the client with respect to such actual or potential difficulties.
Id. at 391.
61. 449 U.S. at 392.
62. Id.
63. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Bryson P. Burnham, The Attorney-Client Privilege
in the Corporate Arena, 24 BUS. LAW. 901, 913 (1969)). See also Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985).
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the rendering of legal advice, and were communications within the
sphere of responsibility of the employees. Thus, concluded the Supreme
54
Court, the privilege must protect the communications from disclosure.
The opinion in Upjohn is significant because the Supreme Court firmly
embraced the attorney-client privilege as applying to corporations and
espoused a belief in the propriety of the utilitarian rationale in the
corporate communication context. Of course, any jurisdiction or court
applying the privilege to corporations has implicitly agreed that the
utilitarian benefits exceed the burdens.
C.

The Importance of Certainty
The attorney-client privilege's utilitarian rationale depends on the
certainty of the rule. If the privilege is to encourage disclosure, the
client must be able to predict that the communicated disclosure will
enjoy the privilege in any possible future legal proceeding. The United
States Supreme Court addressed the importance of certainty in the
privilege calculus in Upjohn,65 stating:
But if the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served, the
attorney and client must be able to predict with some degree of
certainty whether particular discussions will be protected. An
uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in
widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no
privilege at all." '
Lower courts also have recognized the validity and importance of the
certainty principle in the privilege context. For example, the United
States District Court for the District of Delaware stated in Hercules Inc.

64. 449 U.S. at 395. Yet, as Chief Justice Burger pointed out in his concurring opinion,
the opinion in Upjohn does not provide a standard for predictable application. Id. at 402.
Because Upjohn involved federal common law, its teachings do not bind the individual
states. Yet, many states have embraced it and have not limited the privilege to a control
group. See, e.g., National Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. District Court, 718 P.2d 1044,
1048-50 (Colo. 1986); OR. REv. STAT. § 40.225(1)(d) (Butterworths 1995). Some courts have
refused to apply it, relying instead on the control group approach. See, e.g., Consolidation
Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 432 N.E.2d 250, 256-57 (111. 1982); ALASKA RULE OF EviD.
503(A)2 (Michie 1996); TEx. R. EVID.-CIVIL & CRIM. 503(a)(2) (West 1996).

For further discussion of Upjohn, see Stephen A. Saltzburg, Corporate and Related
Attorney-Client PrivilegeClaims: A Suggested Approach, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 279 (1984);
Sexton, supra note 19; Waldman, supra note 15. See also 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
ARTHUR R. MILLER, & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2017, at
264 (1994 & Supp. 1996) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER] (noting the debatable parameters

of an appropriate test).
65. Upjohn, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
66. Id. at 393.
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v. Exxon Corp., "[olnly if the client is assured that the information he
relays in confidence, when seeking legal advice, will be immune from
discovery will he be encouraged to disclose fully all relevant information
to his attorney."68
To obtain a degree of certainty, any utilitarian balancing of the
benefits and burdens of the privilege should occur on a rule basis, not on
an ad hoc case basis.69 Balancing in individual cases cannot occur if
the underlying rationale of the privilege is to succeed because the
communicator client can never with any degree of certainty predict
whether a court will later determine that in the particular facts of a
litigation, the benefits of the privilege outweigh the burdens. Likewise,
for a degree of certainty to obtain, courts must apply the privilege
similarly in similar situations.

67. 434 F. Supp. 136 (D. Del. 1977).
68. Id. at 144. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained the
connection between certainty of application and successful operation of the privilege in
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indemnity Co., 32 F.3d 851 (3d Cir. 1994). The court
stated:
If we intend to serve the interests of justice by encouraging consultation with
counsel free from the apprehension of disclosure, then courts must work to apply
the privilege in ways that are predictable and certain. "An uncertain privilege-or
one which purports to be certain, but rests in widely varying applications by the
courts-is little better than no privilege".
Id. at 863 (quoting In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 100, (2d Cir. 1987)). Apparently, the
Second Circuit quoted Upjohn without attribution. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393. See also
Southern Guar. Ins. Co. v. Ash, 192 Ga. App. 24, 25, 383 S.E.2d 579, 581 (1989) (quoting
Upjohn regarding certainty and expressing the need for a bright line approach).
69. For discussions of the need for certainty in the privilege context, see RICE, supra
note 23, § 2:3, at 57 ("Whatever the scope of the privilege, its application must be clear and
consistent. Only through clarity and consistency is there predictability, and only through
predictability can there be confidence in the protection and a willingness by clients to rely
upon it."); Saltzburg, supra, note 64, at 281 ("The less certain the scope of the privilege, the
less reliance clients can place upon it."); Sexton, supra note 19, at 482; Thornburg, supra
note 19, at 166 (certainty must exist at the time of communication); Waldman, supra note
19, at 498-501; Weissenberger, supra note 56, at 918 (privilege requires predictability);
Developments, supra note 35, at 1486-87; H. Richard Dallas, Note, The Attorney-Client
Privilegeand the Corporationin ShareholderLitigation,50 S. CAL. L. REV. 303, 308 (1977);
The Supreme Court, supra note 42, at 270, 273. But see Note, supra note 35, at 470-71
(doubting the need for rule utilitarianism). While discussing the suggestion of a conditional
privilege, section 118, comment c to the Restatement states: "The predictability of a
definite rule encourages forthright discussions between client and lawyer. The law accepts
the risks of factual error and injustice in individual cases in deference to the values that
the privilege vindicates." RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, at § 118, cmt. c.
For discussion of rule utilitarianism, see RICHARD B. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY 396-400
(1959); John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955); JOHN J.C. SMART &
BERNARD A.O. WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 9-12 (1973).
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DEFINITION OF THE PRIVILEGE

The attorney-client privilege has existed for centuries in Anglo-Saxon
jurisprudence.7" Historically a creature of the common law, the
privilege has been defined in a variety of ways. In modern days, the
shared understanding is that once a court determines that the privilege
applies to a communication, the privilege protects the communication
absolutely.7 A court may not evaluate the opponent's need for the
communication in deciding whether to protect it as courts do when
applying the work product doctrine, 2
Often, in establishing the metes and bounds of the modern attorneyclient privilege, courts refer to one or both of two sources: Judge
Wyzanski's 1950 definition in United States v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp.," and Wigmore's definition in his treatise on evidence law."'
Judge Wyzanski stated:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is
or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate
and (b)in connection With this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3)
the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed
(a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the
purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal
services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the

70. See, e.g., Berd v. Lovelace, 21 Eng. Rep. 33 (1577). See generally Hazard, supra

note 23; Radin, supra note 23. See also RICE, supra note 23.
71. See Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 1493-94 (9th Cir.
1989); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sun Co.), 599 F.2d 1224, 1233 (3d Cir. 1979);
Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1978); Henson v. Wyeth
Labs., Inc., 118 F.R.D. 584, 587 (W.D. Va. 1987); United States Auto. Ass'n v. Crews, 614
So. 2d 1213, 1214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). But see Sackman v. Liggett Group, Inc., 920
F. Supp. 357, 365 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (public policy of public health overcomes the privilege);
Leonen v. Johns-Manville, 135 F.R.D. 94, 98 (D.N.J. 1990) (not absolute); Spectrum Sys.
Int'l Corp. v. Chemical Bank, 581 N.E.2d 1055, 1062 (N.Y. 1991) (privilege not absolute;
can be overcome on "extraordinary public policy grounds").

72.

The work product doctrine protects attorney product done in anticipation of

litigation. The protection can be overcome by a showing of "substantial need" and inability
"without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other
means." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). See generally
Jeff A. Anderson et al., Special Project, The Work Product Doctrine, 68 CORNELL L. REV.
760 (1983); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Rethinking Work Product, 77 VA. L. REV. 1515 (1991).
See also MCCORMICK, supra note 23, § 96; MODERN EVIDENCE supra note 56, § 5.31-32; 8
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 64, §§ 2021-28.
73. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
74. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2292, at 554.
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purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been
(a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.75
Wigmore stated that the attorney client privilege could apply
(1) [w]here legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional
legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating
to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his
instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure76by himself or by the
legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.

Both of these definitions deal with the communication from the client
to the attorney but do not address communications flowing from the
attorney to the client. Many courts take the position that the privilege
protects attorney communications to clients only to the extent that the
communications reveal the substance of confidential client communications.77 Other courts seem to apply the privilege to all attorney advice,
opinion or other communications without analysis of the relationship to
client confidences.78

75. 89 F. Supp. at 358-59. For cases using this definition, see, e.g., Montogmery v.
Leftwich, Moore & Douglas, 161 F.R.D. 224, 226 (D.D.C. 1995); Great Plains Mutual Ins.
Co. v. Mutual Reinsurance Bureau, 150 F.RD. 193, 196 (D. Kan. 1993); Burroughs
Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 143 F.R.D. 611, 615 (E.D.N.C. 1992); In re Arthur
Treacher's Franchisee Litig., 92 F.R.D. 429, 434 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
76. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2292, at 554. For cases quoting this definition, see,
e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated September 15, 1983 (Marc Rich &
Co.), 731 F.2d 1032, 1036 (2d Cir. 1984); Pacamor Bearings, Inc. v. Minebea Co., 918 F.
Supp. 491, 510 (D.N.H. 1996); In re Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. United States, 170 B.R.
331, 354 (S.D. Ohio 1994); Pippenger v. Gruppe, 883 F. Supp. 1201, 1203 (S.D. Ind. 1994);
Fromson v. Anitec Printing Plates, Inc., 152 F.R.D. 2, 3 (D. Mass. 1993).
Neither of these definitions deal with the exceptions to the privilege, perhaps the most
notable of which is the inapplicability of the privilege to a communication in furtherance
of a crime or fraud. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 132 F.R.D. 12, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1990);
Coleman v. American Broadcasting Co., 106 F.R.D. 201, 206-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). See also
24 WRIGHT & GRAHAM,

supra note 26, § 5501.

77. See, e.g., Sackman v. Liggett Group, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 357, 364 (E.D.N.Y. 1996);
Montgomery v. Leftwich, Moore & Douglas, 161 F.R.D. 224, 226 (D.D.C. 1995); Glaxo, Inc.
v. Novopharm, Ltd., 148 F.R.D. 535,538 (E.D.N.C. 1993); Henson v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 118
F.R.D. 584, 587 (W.D. Va. 1987). See also MODERN EVIDENCE, supra note 56, § 5.12.
78. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. v. Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp., 852 F. Supp. 156,
163 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (upheld privilege application "where the documents reveal client
confidences or provide legal assistance"); Quail Ridge Assocs. v. Chemical Bank, 571
N.Y.S.2d 648, 650 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (privilege applies to communications by attorney
for the purpose of rendering legal advice or services).
The Proposed Final Draft of the Restatement (Third)of the Law Governing Lawyers has
adopted the approach of applying the privilege to all lawyer-client communications without
regard to its relation to client communication. Section 118 states: "Except as otherwise
provided in this Restatement, the attorney-client privilege may be invoked as provided in
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All versions of the privilege agree that the privilege protects only
communications, not the facts contained in the communications
themselves. 9 If the chief executive officer of a corporation has a
conversation with the corporation's counsel about the company's stock,
the privilege may protect the conversation. The privilege does not
prevent executive from being deposed about his knowledge of the stock
on the day in question before he spoke to the attorney.'
IV.

THE LEGAL OR BUSINESS CONFUSION

An issue that courts encounter frequently in applying the attorneyclient privilege in the corporate setting is whether the communication
relates to the legal representation or rather is really a creature of
business."' As is obvious from the definitions above, the privilege
traditionally protects only communications in the legal sphere. Relying
on the utilitarian rationale, courts have noted that the privilege exists
so that clients will be forthcoming with their attorneys and thus the
attorneys can render superior legal representation. The reasoning
continues that the privilege protects client communications for the
purpose of obtaining legal advice, and that client communications for
other reasons, such as communications for the purpose of obtaining
business advice, do not enjoy the privilege.82 Because almost all that

§ 135 with respect to: (1) a communication (2) made between privileged persons (3) in
confidence (4) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance for the client."
RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, at § 118. The proposed but never adopted Federal Rule of
Evidence 503 also used this approach. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 26, 18. See
also CAL. EVID. CODE ANN. § 952 (West 1995); IND. CODE ANN § 34-1-14-5 (Burns 1996).
79. United States v. Upjohn, 449 U.S. 383,395-96(1981); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.
495, 516 (1947) (Justice Jackson recognized the limit of obfuscation which can be laid at
the feet of the privilege, stating: "Discovery was hardly intended to enable a learned
profession to perform its functions ... on wits borrowed from the adversary."). See also
Pippenger v. Gruppe, 883 F. Supp. 1201, 1208 (S.D. Ind. 1994).
80. A related principle is that any document not created for the purpose of communicating with an attorney, sometimes referred to as a preexisting document, is not privileged
if it was not privileged in the hands of the client. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,
403-04 (1976). Rice argues that the preexisting document should not be obtainable from
the attorney, but only the client, because the transmission of the document is in itself a
protected communication. See RICE, supra note 23, § 5:19, at 368-70.
81. Federal judges and magistrates interviewed in' the late 1980s in New York City
noted it as one of the most frequent privilege issues before their court. Alexander, supra
note 41, at 258.
82. Some courts specifically analyze a communication in terms of causal motivation.
See, e.g., Griffin v. Davis, 161 F.R.D. 687, 697 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (if business advice were a
"sufficient cause," no privilege applied); McCaugherty v. Siffermann, 132 F.R.D. 234, 238
(N.D. Cal. 1990).
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a corporation does is "business," communications by corporations to legal
counsel are particularly vulnerable on this issue.83
Legal Advice, Service, or Assistance
In dealing with the question of whether the privilege applies to the
communication before it, a court must first define what kinds of activity
the privilege protects so that the court can then measure the communication before it against the protected class. Definition of the class of
communications protected has been elusive. Wigmore's definition of the
privilege focuses on situations in which clients seek "legal advice."s4
Judge Wyzanski's definition focuses on situations in which clients seek
"(i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal
proceeding. " s Likewise, some courts have analyzed application of the
privilege in terms of legal advice 8 while others have focused on "legal
service" or "legal assistance." 7 For example, the United States District
Court for the District of New Hampshire in PacamorBearings, Inc. v.
Minebea Co.,' required that the document relate "'to facts communicat-

A.

83. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated September 15, 1983 (Marc Rich & Co.
A.G. v. United States), 731 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1984). A corporation was considering a
corporate reorganization to achieve business purposes. The corporation consulted with

outside counsel regarding "tax consequences of a reorganization and whether those
consequences should affect the structure of the corporate realignment, and as to corporate
law considerations in structuring the reorganization." Id. at 1307. The court noted that
the resulting documents "memorialize client confidences obtained in the pursuit of legal
advice concerning the mechanics and consequences of alternative business strategies." Id.
84. See supra text accompanying note 76.
85. See supra text accompanying note 75.
86. In Diversey U.S. Holdings, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., No. 91 C 6234, 1994 WL 71462
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 1994), the district court stated that the client must be "seeking legal
advice." Id. at *1. The court did not clarify whether the documents in question were from
attorney to client or from client to attorney. One can assume that the court believed the
test was the same in either situation. See also Itoba, Ltd. v. LEP Group PLC, 930 F. Supp.
36, 43 (D. Conn. 1996) ("obtaining or providing legal advice"). Montgomery v. Leftwich,
Moore & Douglas, 161 F.R.D. 224, 224-26 (D.D.C. 1995) (stated the broad Wyzanski test,
but narrowed the analysis to "legal advice" when applying the test to the documents before
the court prepared by counsel); Griffith v. Davis, 161 F.R.D. 687, 694 (C.D. Cal. 1995)
("generating legal advice"); Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 148 F.R.D. 535, 540 (E.D.N.C.
1993) ("legal advice or requests for such advice").
87. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 862 (3d Cir. 1994)
(Wyzanski test); Sackman v. Liggett Group, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 357, 365 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)
("relate to the rendition of legal advice or legal services"); In re Leslie Fay Cos., Inc. Sec.
Litig., 161 F.R.D. 274, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (privileged when client seeks "legal advice or
services"); Quail Ridge Assocs. v. Chemical Bank, 571 N.Y.S.2d 648, 650 (N.Y. App. Div.
1991) (client communication: for the purpose of "legal advice"; attorney communication:
"facilitating the rendition of legal advice or services").
88. 918 F. Supp. 491 (D.N.H. 1996).
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ed for the purpose of securing a legal opinion, legal services or assistance
in a legal proceeding.'"89 And in Rossi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,9'
the New York court stated that the client must communicate for the
purpose of obtaining legal advice, but that the privilege applies to
attorney communications if made for the "purpose of facilitating the
rendition of legal advice or services, in the course of a professional
relationship."9 1
Professor Hazard has argued that the historical roots of the attorneyLimiting the
client privilege are tied to the litigation context. 2
privilege to a narrow definition of "legal advice" may be consistent with
this view of the history. Perhaps such a limitation is also consistent
with what clients asked attorneys to do for them years ago. Limiting
protection to communications for the purpose of obtaining "legal advice"
seems rather narrow given the types of work attorneys now do and that
clients frequently ask attorneys to do, such as negotiate deals and
construct contracts. Why should the privilege not apply to client
communications with an attorney in which the client tells the attorney
facts essential to creating a contract or other transaction for a client that
serves the client's interest best? Or would a court find that scenario to
be one in which the client communicated for the purpose of obtaining
"legal advice?" The terms "legal service" or "legal assistance" may be
more consistent with the realities of how clients now use and rely on
attorneys. Yet, even these terms, though broader than "legal advice,"
are to an extent unclear in definition.
The Proposed Final Draft of the Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers, perhaps, suggests an improvement. The Restatement applies the privilege to communications "for the purpose of
obtaining or providing legal assistance for the client."93 In attempting
to define "legal assistance," a comment states:
The claimant of privilege must have consulted the lawyer to obtain
legal counseling or advice, document preparation, litigation services, or
any other assistance customarily performed by lawyers in their
professional capacity. A lawyer's assistance is legal in nature if the
lawyer's professional skill and training would have value in the
matter.94
89. Id. at 510 (quoting United States v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv.,
Inc., 874 F.2d 20, 27-28 (1st Cir. 1989)).

90. 540 N.E.2d 703 (N.Y. 1989).
91. Id. at 706. See also Spectrum Sys. Intl Corp. v. Chemical Bank, 581 N.E.2d. 1055,
1060 (N.Y. 1991) (quoting Rossi regarding communications from attorneys).
92. Hazard, supra note 23.
93. RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, at § 118.
94. RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, at § 122 cmt. b.
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Although the list of activities provided does reject a narrow notion of
litigation-related advice or assistance, the second sentence suggests the
real improvement because it focuses attention on the lawyer's "skill and
training" as opposed to focusing on any idea of customary lawyer duties,
a concept which could easily become an out-of-date exclusive list.
In the past, the lack of precision in delineating the standard courts
should apply has set the tenor for the confused application of the
imprecise standard. Perhaps a more open and realistic view of what
ought to be privileged as legal representation communications, such as
that suggested in the Restatement, will eliminate futile attempts to
define the many and various facets of lawyers' occupations.
ProfessionalLegal Capacity
McCormick, in his treatise on evidence, stated that "[wihere one
consults an attorney not as a lawyer but as a friend or as a business

B.

advisor ..

,

or as an agent, the consultation is not professional nor the

statement privileged."95 This statement accords with both Wigmore's
and Judge Wyzanski's definition of the privilege in that both definitions
seem to require, in addition to the legal advice requirement, that the
attorney act in the role of lawyer." Some of the confusion as to what
the client must seek by the communication, that is, what kinds of
activities the privilege ought to protect, also arises when courts attempt
to analyze whether the attorney acts in the role of attorney.
Some courts have interpreted this requirement as an inquiry into
whether what the lawyer did, and presumably, what the client sought,
was a function traditional to attorneys. This approach requires courts
to analyze application of the privilege on the basis of a rather static
notion of lawyer functions, but courts have not agreed on what they
should include in that category of traditional lawyer functions.
In Diversey U.S. Holdings, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp.," the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois stated that the
attorney must act in a legal capacity and the client must seek legal
advice.98 In addressing the capacity argument, the court noted that the
attorneys had negotiated the language of a contract with a third party
and that the attorneys had submitted drafts of the contract to corporate

95. MCCORMICK, supra note 23, § 88. See also In re Shell Oil Refinery, 812 F. Supp.
658, 662 (E.D. La. 1993).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 75-76.
97.

No. 91 C 6234, 1994 WL 71462 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 1994).

98. Id. at *1.
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management to obtain information on how the deal might affect areas
of the corporation. The court stated:
This strikes us as the gathering of information by an attorney from the
client to enable the attorney to provide competent legal services-in
this case, the drafting of a contract. Drafting legal documents is a core
activity of lawyers, and obtaining information and feedback from
clients is a necessary part of the process. 9
In contrast, in Georgia-PacificCorp. v. GAF Roofing Manufacturing
Corp.,' ° an in-house attorney negotiated provisions of a contract and
communicated with management with regard to various strategies to
follow in the negotiation of the contract provisions. The United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York held that "[als a
negotiator on behalf of management, [the attorney) was acting in a
business capacity."'
In deciding whether the lawyer acted as a lawyer, some courts have
looked to whether a nonlawyer could do the task even though a lawyer
might do it better. In Sackman v. Liggett Group, Inc.,'O° the court, in
reviewing the attorneys' activities, stated:
The documents instead demonstrate that the attorneys were serving a
function other than that of a legal advisor. Counsel to the tobacco
companies were functioning in a scientific, administrative, or public
relations capacity in taking the action that they did. The role
delegated to the attorneys was one that could have been performed by
the Scientific Advisory Board, a doctor or scientist, or a tobacco
company executive."0"
Likewise, in National Employment Service Corp. v. Liberty Mutual
Insurance Co.,1°4 the Massachusetts state court stated that to determine whether a lawyer acted in the capacity of lawyer, one must

99. Id. The district court also found the client to be seeking legal advice. Id.
100. No. 93 Civ. 5125 (RPP), 1996 WL 29392 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 1996).
101. Id. at *4. In United States Postal Service v. Phelps Dodge Refining Corp., 852 F.
Supp 156, 164 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of New York found that communications relating to lobbying efforts did not enjoy the
privilege because "lobbying conducted by attorneys does not necessarily constitute legal
services for purposes of the attorney-client privilege." Id. at 164. See also J.P. Foley & Co.
v. Vanderbilt, 65 F.R.D. 523,526 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (attorney acting as negotiator or business
agent not subject to privilege).
102. 920 F. Supp. 357 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
103. Id. at 365.
104. No. 93-2528-G, 1994 WL 878920 (Mass. Super. Dec. 12, 1994).
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consider whether a nonlawyer could do the task or rather whether the
task was a "lawyer-related task." 0 5
Attorneys use their legal expertise, knowledge, and training to assist
clients in an ever-evolving variety of ways. Any attempt to analyze an
attorney's capacity regarding a communication in light of traditional
functions of attorneys cannot be done without flexibility. For example,
in the past, negotiating and drafting contracts for clients may not have
been a traditional function for attorneys. In the latter part of the
twentieth century, attorneys frequently negotiate and draft contracts for
clients and use legal expertise and training in doing so."° Courts
should not deny the privilege to client disclosures to obtain such lawyer
services simply because the services rendered do not resemble litigation
assistance or work typically done by an attorney in 1900 or even 1950.
Not all communications with an attorney should enjoy the privilege, but
sorting communications on the basis of a notion of capacity, that in turn
has opinions of traditional functions of attorneys as a basis, is a flawed
methodology. Rather, courts should analyze situations to determine
whether the client sought the application of an attorney's skill and
training.
Another problem with the capacity requirement, at least in the
corporate context, is that such a requirement assumes that a court can
determine which "hat" or "suit"10 7 an attorney wears at the time of a

105. Id. at *2. The court then gave examples: applying law to facts, reviewing client
acts in light of laws, advising about law and trends in law. Id In Jackson v. Capital Bank
& Trust Co., Civ. A. Nos. 90-4734, 90-4735, 1993 WL 413141 (E.D. La. Oct. 7, 1993), an
attorney held the position of senior claims attorney in the claims department. Id. at *1.
The court looked at the documents in question to determine whether the attorney
performed the tasks of an attorney. The court concluded that the attorney was not acting
as an attorney and in doing so noted the attorney's comments written on a draft form. The
court noted that the attorney mentioned that a court might find one area of the form
ambiguous, "but that is a comment that could be made by a non-attorney." Id. at *2.
Management sent documents to the legal department for legal review and management did
not indicate that the documents were sent to the claims department for legal review. Id.
Attorneys occasionally conduct internal investigations. In Upjohn the United States
Supreme Court treated such activity as within the purview of the privilege. See Upjohn
Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). See also United States v. Rowe, 96 F.3d 1294,
1296-97 (9th Cir. 1996) (fact-gathering is a "professional legal service ."). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in DiversifiedIndustries,Inc. v. Meredith,
572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978), noted that such activity "could have been performed just as
readily by non-lawyers." Id. at 603.
106. See Terry Woolsey, The In-Betweener: Venture-CapitalLawyers PairInvestors with
Entrepreneurs, Bus. LAW TODAY, Nov.IDec. 1996, at 14 (discussing the role of attorneys
in negotiating deals).
107. Courts and commentators often talk in terms of hats or suits when dealing with
this issue. See, e.g., Albert, supra note 6, at 474 (using the hats jargon); United States v.
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particular communication somewhat independent of the analysis of
whether the communication relates to the obtaining or rendering of legal
advice, service, or assistance. The assumption does not comport with
reality. Outside of the corporate sphere, it may be possible to do that.
A court may be able to state with certainty that with regard to a real
estate deal, for example, that the attorney was involved as an investor,
not as an attorney. Yet, even in that situation, if another investor
communicated to the attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice,
one wonders whether the court would determine that the attorney acted
in the capacity of lawyer and hold the communication privileged. Or
would the court refuse to apply the privilege on the basis of a failure of
the capacity requirement even though the client sought legal advice,
service or assistance by the communication?
Within the corporate sphere, courts cannot truly determine capacity
without analyzing the nature of the particular communication at issue.
In-house and outside counsel to corporations may officially have dual
responsibilities. These attorneys may hold positions as officers or
directors, for example, or may otherwise responsible for nonlegal
areas. ' Yet, these attorneys do not really change hats, nor do they
separate their work days into nonlegal and legal parts.
To determine capacity in such a setting, courts must look at capacity
for the particular communication. To the extent the court evaluates the
particular communication and evaluates the nature of what the client
sought or what the attorney rendered as a way of determining capacity,
the capacity analysis simply repeats the analysis of whether the client
seeks legal advice, service, or assistance. The repetitive analysis
becomes a source of confusion for courts.
Many attorneys have no official nonlegal responsibilities, yet clients
request and these lawyers render nonlegal services. 9 Frequently,
business advice mixes with legal advice in a single communication. With
regard to distinguishing legal advice, service, or assistance, the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey stated in Leonen v.
n
"Although the rule is clearly stated, its application
Johns-Manville:"
is difficult, since in the corporate community, legal advice 'is often
intertwined with and difficult to distinguish from business
intimately
1
advice.'""
Vehicular Parking, Ltd., 52 F. Supp. 751, 754 (D. Del. 1943) (using the suit jargon).
108. See supra notes 4 & 6 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 5 & 7 and accompanying text and infra Part V(B).

110. 135 F.R.D. 94 (D.N.J. 1990).
111. Id. at 98-99 (quoting Sedco Intl, S.A. v. Cory, 683 F.2d 1201, 1205 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982)). See also United States v. Chevron, No. C-94-1885 SBA,
1996 WL 264769 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 1996), in which the district court quoted the
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If courts analyze these situations for capacity, they might conclude
that a lack of official nonlegal duty shows that the attorney acted in an
attorney capacity regarding the communication. Or a court might
conclude that the fact that an attorney is an outside attorney shows that
the attorney acted in an attorney capacity." 2 Yet, such decisions,
based on status, seem of little value to privilege analysis, and ultimately,
to privilege objectives. Other courts might evaluate the attorney's
capacity in light of the particular communication in question. If a court
chooses this latter path, again the capacity analysis repeats the analysis
required to determine if the client seeks by the communication legal
advice, service, or assistance.
Courts can streamline and improve the analysis of the applicability of
the privilege by eliminating the capacity analysis entirely. Some courts
already appear to forego treating the professional legal capacity
requirement as a separate issue." 3 If a court determines that a
communication satisfies the other definitional requirements of the
privilege,. including the requirement that by the communication the
client seek or obtain legal advice, service, or assistance, then the
underlying rationale of the privilege would suggest that the privilege
apply.
C.

Applying the Legal Advice Requirement

How does a court determine whether the client, in communicating
with the attorney, sought legal advice, service, or assistance or that the
attorney in communicating rendered such? Unfortunately, courts have
approached this question from many perspectives and have reached
varied results. Courts repeatedly acknowledge that clients need not

magistrate's statement:
In this case, the attorney-client privilege is being invoked by Chevron to protect
documents which largely reflect an amalgamation of tax and business strategy.
This strategy involves both business people and their business-related decisions,
as well as attorneys and their legal advice regarding past decisions made and
future decisions considered. It is therefore extremely difficult to determine exactly
where the business advice starts and the legal advice ends-this precludes a neat

separation between the two.
Id. at *2. In Sealy Mattress Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 1987 WL 12500 (Del. Ch. June 19, 1987),
the Delaware court stated that the "letter contains an admixture of business and legal
advice that is not readily divisible into separate categories. Indeed, any effort to parse the

advice which is 'legal' from that which is business' would be hazardous at best." Id. at *3.
Some of the documents considered in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89
F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950), contained a mix of business and legal advice. Id. at 359.
112. See United States v. Chevron, No. C-94-1885 SBA 1996 WL 264769, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 13, 1996) (discussing such a presumption).
113. See, e.g., Motley v. Marathon Oil Co., 71 F.3d 1547 (10th Cir. 1995).
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request advice, service, or assistance expressly."' Even so, courts
have placed the burden on the party claiming the privilege to establish
that the privilege applies." 5 Some courts require fairly rigorous proof.
For example, in Western Trails, Inc. v. Camp Coast to Coast, Inc.,"'
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia had before
it the outside general counsel's affidavit stating that he rendered legal
advice with the communications. The client asserted that the attorney7
acted as an attorney in "opining on the legality" of a corporate plan."
The court stated, "[clonclusory statements asserting the elements of the
privilege, however, are not sufficient to establish the privilege.""' The
court went on to analyze whether the documents contained legal advice
and concluded that some did not. The court supported denial of the
privilege to one of the documents with the fact that the attorney stated
in the document that he had not researched the issue being discussed.
To the court, this statement indicated that the document was not legal
advice." 9
Occasionally courts have suggested that they should presume that
communications are for the sake of legal advice if the attorney acts in
the capacity of professional legal advisor. 20 However, as explained

114. "'Client communications intended to keep the attorney apprised of business
matters may be privileged if they embody "an implied request for legal advice based thereon."'" Pacamor Bearings, Inc. v. Minebea Co., 918 F. Supp. 491,511 (D.N.H. 1996) (quoting
Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397, 404 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 917 (1987)
(quoting Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 54 F.R.D. 44, 46 (N.D. Cal. 1971))). See also
Barr Marine Prods. Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 84 F.R.D. 631, 636 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
115. See, e.g., Motley v. Marathon Oil Co., 71 F.3d 1547, 1550 (10th Cir. 1995); Tornay
v. United States, 840 F.2d 1424, 1426 (9th Cir. 1988); von Bulow by Auersperg v. von
Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015 (1987); Itoba, Ltd. v. LEP
Group PLC, 930 F. Supp. 36, 43 (D. Conn. 1996); Pacamor Bearings, Inc. v. Minebea Co.,
918 F. Supp. 491 (D.N.H. 1996); Western Trails, Inc. v. Camp Coast to Coast, Inc., 139
F.R.D. 4, 8 (D.D.C. 1991). See also Bowne of New York City, Inc. v. AmBase Corp., 150
F.R.D. 465, 472-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (rejecting notion that opponent of claim of privilege
must make some "initial showing" that the claim is not "well-founded"); United States v.
Chevron, No. C-94-1885 SBA 1996 WL 264769 (N.D. Cal. Mar, 13, 1996) (district court
instructed the magistrate that the magistrate had incorrectly applied a presumption of
privilege). Id. at *2.4.
116. 139 F.R.D. 4 (D.D.C. 1991).
117. Id. at 11.
118. Id.
119. ld.
120. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2296 ("A matter committed to a professional legal
adviser is prima facie so committed for the sake of legal advice ... and is therefore within
the privilege unless it appears to be lacking in aspects requiring legal advice."). See also
Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus., Ltd., No. C-93-4899, 1996 WL 288511 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30,
1996) (court applied presumption to outside counsel billing statements); In re Federated
Dep't Stores, Inc. v. United States, 170 B.R. 331, 354-55 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (government
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earlier, in the corporate context a court cannot properly resolve the
capacity issue unless the court evaluates the nature of the communication between client and attorney. The presumption then has no value.
In determining whether the claimant has met the burden of proving
that the privilege applies, courts must recognize that the clients of many
lawyers, even those lawyers with no official management responsibilities,
request traditionally nonlegal services, and those attorneys render that
assistance. Courts must also recognize that often the legal and other
services are stirred into the same communication. Professor Vincent
Alexander's study of New York City corporations and their attorneys
supports the notion that attorneys, in-house and outside, routinely give
business advice.12' For example, in the securities context, the client
corporation may consult an attorney about the prospect of raising capital
with a public offering. The client wants an attorney to lead it through
this valley of legal requirements and regulations, but also expects the
attorney to provide insight into business ramifications the corporation
might feel in the short or long term. The client seeks the attorney's
advice and guidance because the attorney, though not a business person,
has done similar deals with other corporations. Management of the
corporation may not know or understand all the alternatives and
consequent business effects of the undertaking."
Many courts recognize the nature of corporate representation. For
example, in Note Funding Corp. v. Bobian Investment Co., N.V, 1 the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
recognized that clients consult attorneys for business as well as legal
reasons. The court stated:
In pursuing large and complex financial transactions, commercial
entities often seek the assistance of attorneys who are well equipped

could not overcome presumption); Coleman v. American Broadcasting Cos., 106 F.R.D. 201,
206 (D.D.C. 1985) (with prima facie showing that the communications relate to legal
matters, other party must make some showing to the contrary); Shell Oil Co. v. Par Four
Partnership, 638 So. 2d 1050, 1050 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (if communication appears
on its face to be privileged, other party has burden of proving they are not). In SEC v. Gulf
& Western Indus., Inc., 518 F. Supp. 675, 683 (D.D.C. 1981), the court believed that the
corporation had not met its burden of proving that the information came to the attorney
as attorney, but was prepared to apply a presumption had that proof existed.
121. Eighty-nine point two percent of attorneys interviewed as a part of the Alexander
study said they give business advice. See Alexander, supra note 41, at 339-41. See also
infra Part V(B).
122. For a glimpse of the lawyer role in the area of venture capital, see Woolsey, supra
note 106, at 14. ("Lawyers who work in this unique area play an integral role, offering
their clients legal know-how, business prowess and connections in the world of finance.").
123. No. 93 Civ 7427 (DAB), 1995 WL 662402 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1995).
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both by training and by experience to assess the risks and advantages
in alternative business strategies. When providing this assistance,
counsel are not limited to offering their client purely abstract advice as
to the rules of law that may apply to their situation. Of necessity,
counsel will often be required to assess specific tactics in putting
together transactions or shaping the terms of commercial agreements,
and their evaluation of alternative approaches may well take into
account not only the potential impact of applicable legal norms, but
also the commercial needs of their client and the financial benefits or
risks of these alternative strategies." 2
As a result of the "intimately intertwined" nature of corporate
representation, many courts have required corporations to prove, with
regard to a particular communication, that it sought "primarily" legal
advice, service, or assistance, or rendered "primarily" such.' 25 Similarly, some courts require that "the legal advice given to the client must be
the predominant element in the communication," or that, with regard to
the communication, the2 corporation sought "predominantly" legal advice,
service, or assistance.1 1
In Note Funding,27 the court deftly applied this type of analysis.

The court looked to whether the client consulted the attorney "at least
in part, because of his legal expertise and the advice rests 'predomi-

nantly' on his assessment of the requirements imposed, or the opportunities offered, by applicable rules of law." 28 The court focused on
"whether the attorney's performance depends principally on his
knowledge of or application of legal requirements or principles, rather

124. Id. at *2.
125. See, e.g., Sedco Intl, S.A. v. Cory, 683 F.2d 1201, 1205-06 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1017 (1982) ("primarily legal advice"); United States v. Chevron, No. C-94-1885
SBA, 1996 WL 264769, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 1996) (directing the magistrate that no
presumptions of privilege should be used but rather the claimant must prove that the
communications in question were "made primarily for the purpose of generating legal
advice"); Griffith v. Davis, 161 F.R.D. 687, 697 (C.D. Cal. 1995) ("primarily for the purpose
of generating legal advice") (quoting McCaugherty v. Siffermann, 132 F.R.D. 234,238 (N.D.
Cal. 1990)); Pippenger v. Gruppe, 883 F Supp. 1201, 1207 (S.D. Ind. 1994) (communications
"primarily for the purpose of securing legal opinions and legal services") (quoting United
States v. Loften, 518 F. Supp. 839, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)); Cuno, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 121
F.R.D. 198, 201 (E.D.N.Y. 1988X"primary purpose of the communication"); Henson v.
Wyeth Labs., Inc., 118 F.R.D. 584, 587 (W.D. Va. 1987).
126. See, e.g., Allendale Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 152 F.R.D. 132, 137
(N.D. Ill. 1993); United States v. Davis, 132 F.R.D. 12, 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Leonen v. JohnsManville, 135 F.R.D. 94, 99 (D.N.J. 1990).
127. No. 93 Civ. 7427 (DAB), 1995 WL 662402 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1995).
128. Id. at *3 (quoting Rossi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 540 N.E.2d 703, 706 (N.Y.
1989)).
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than his expertise in matters of commercial practice."'2 Although the
court acknowledged that many of the documents contained extensive
discussions of "financial questions and issues of commercial strategy and
tactics," the court noted that the discussions occurred "in a context that
makes it evident that the attorney is presenting the issues and
analyzing the choices on the basis of his legal expertise and with an
obvious eye to the constraints imposed by applicable law.""3 Thus, the
privilege protected the documents. 3'
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California used a different analysis in Griffith v. Davis,132 in applying
the same "primarily" standard to a situation not involving a corporation.
The court first stated that the privilege applied only to communications
In
made "'primarily for the purpose of generating legal advice. ' ""
deciding whether the communication had primarily that purpose, the
court stated: "[No privilege can attach to any communication as to
which a business purpose would have served as a sufficient cause, i.e.,
any communication that would have been made because of a business
purpose, even if there had been no perceived additional interest in
securing legal advice.""3 4 Because the client communication in question would have occurred for reasons other than the pursuit of legal
advice, the privilege did not apply."
Courts applying this standard sometimes seem to limit consideration
to whether more paragraphs on the document that constitutes the
communication deal with business issues or legal issues, regardless of
the communicators' purposes. In Itoba, Ltd. v. LEP Group PLC,'36 the
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut stated that
the claimant must prove that the communication was "made for the
purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice."' 37 Yet, the court then
decided the application of the privilege by noting that "the information
The
contained in [the document] is primarily business related.""
given
must
be
privilege
to
apply
the
"advice
court concluded that for the

129. Id&
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 161 F.R.D. 687 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
133. Id. at 697 (quoting McCaugherty v. Siffermann, 132 F.R.D. 234, 238 (N.D. Cal.
1990)) (emphasis in original).
134. See also McCaugherty, 132 F.R.D. at 238 (using same causation approach).
135. Griffith, 161 F.R.D. at 697.
136. 930 F. Supp. 36 (D. Conn. 1996).
137. Id. at 43.
138. Id.
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predominantly legal, as opposed to business, in nature."'39 In CooperRutter Associates, Inc. v. Anchor National Life Insurance Co., 140 the
New York state court considered two memoranda written by the in-house
attorney who also held the office of corporate secretary. The memoranda
discussed the business and legal aspects of the corporation's then
ongoing negotiations regarding a business transaction. The court noted
that "the documents were not primarily of a legal character, but
expressed substantial
non-legal concerns," and thus the memoranda
4
were not privileged.1 1
If a court follows the common rule that the privilege applies to
attorney communications only if those communications reveal client
communications made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, a focus
on the percentage of the document which is legal is misguided. To the
extent that the court applies a rule protecting communications by
attorneys for the purpose of rendering legal advice, the percentage
content of the document is more relevant. Yet purpose or motivation is
important and the court should consider it. If the court applies a rule
protecting attorney communications which involve legal advice regardless of client or attorney
purpose, perhaps the exact content percentages
42
are more useful.
Courts, though repeatedly called upon to decide the issue of whether
a document is privileged or not, have devised no useful guiding
principles for applying the primarily or predominantly standard. Courts
can, and have, interpreted and applied the standard in a variety of ways.
Such decisions are extremely subjective, and given the fact that the
privilege decision usually involves in camera review of documents,"
application of the standard cannot be subject to the same scrutiny other
decisions of the courts enjoy. In addition, with this test, some communications in which a client seeks legal advice will not enjoy the privilege
because other advice or information has, in the particular court's
opinion, overshadowed the legal advice sought. The application of an

139. Id. See also Rossi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 540 N.E.2d 703, 706 (N.Y. 1989)
("[slo long as the communication is primarily or predominantly of a legal character");
Spectrum Sys. Intl Corp. v. Chemical Bank, 581 N.E.2d 1055, 1060 (N.Y. 1991)
("communication itself must be primarily or predominantly of a legal character").
140. 563 N.Y.S.2d 491 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
141. Id. at 492.
142. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.

143. Courts usually decide whether a document is privileged on the basis of the
claimant's statements of applicability, supporting affidavits, and in camera review. See,
e.g., Note Funding Corp. v. Bobian Inv. Co., N.V. No. 93 Civ. 7427 (DAB), 1995 WL 662402,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1995) (claimant proffered affidavits, a "privilege log" containing the
bases for its claims of privilege, and relied upon in camera inspection).
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underinclusive standard such as this is consistent with the stated intent
of many courts to keep the attorney-client privilege carefully reined.'"
Courts, of course, could use a standard that requires that the communication have a solely legal purpose, but that standard would leave even
more communications that are partially for the purpose of obtaining
legal representation unprivileged. Finally, courts could apply a standard
finding all communications privileged if seeking legal advice motivated
the client at all.'45 Although such a standard is overinclusive, it would
protect all communications for the purpose of seeking legal advice, and
thus would have the greatest impact on the encouragement of client
candor. An overinclusive standard may be more true to and effective in
obtaining the utilitarian goal of the privilege. Yet, the burdens may
outweigh the benefits.
The primarily or predominantly standard may be the superior
standard on a policy basis. Yet, its application by the courts has not
created an environment of certainty with regard to corporate communications. Whatever the standard applied, it must translate into an
The
understandable guide for prospective client communication.
difficulty courts have had in defining the protected class of communications and in determining which documents dealing, in whole or part,
with those subject matters enjoy the protection of the privilege, has
created an environment in which many courts are simply lost without
shared realistic guides. The confusion has led some courts to decide
privilege on assumptions based on status, which perhaps allows biases
to be interjected into the analysis.
V. THE BIAS PROBLEM

AnticorporationBias
Because jurisdictions accept that the attorney-client privilege applies
to corporations, one would think it logical to assume good faith from
members of the legal profession and their clients in the assertion of
attorney-client privilege absent specific evidence of abuse. However, in

A.

144. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
145. See United States v. Chevron, No. C-94-1885 SBA, 1996 WL 264769, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 13, 1996) (district court found fault with magistrate's statement that "the
attorney-client privilege is triggered only by the exchange of some measure of legal advice,
as contrasted with purely business advice"). The Restatement states that the "client must
consult the lawyer for the purpose of obtaining legal assistance and not predominantly for
another purpose." RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, at § 122 cmt. c. This statement seems to

suggest that the focus should be not on whether the purpose is predominantly legal but
whether it is predominantly something else.
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applying the privilege to corporations, some courts seem to have adopted
the habit of assuming that corporations and their counsel abuse the
privilege or simply assume that the communication does not relate to
legal advice, service, or assistance. The burden arguments raised in the
debate about the appropriateness of an attorney-client privilege reappear
as a rationale justifying a heightened scrutiny analysis to claims of
privilege by corporations.14
The corporation must prove more than
individuals do in proving that the privilege applies. In doing so, the
corporation must overcome assumptions of sharp dealing.
Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Deason'47 exemplifies
the more substantial proof burden. The Supreme Court of Florida in
that case noted that "to minimize the threat of corporations cloaking
information with the attorney-client privilege in order to avoid discovery,
claims of the privilege in the corporate context will be subjected to a
heightened level of scrutiny.""4 Another example of, arguably, an
increased proof burden is in McCaugherty v. Siffermann,45 in which
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California
stated that if there is a "clear business purpose in the environment in
which the communications occurred," there must be a "clear evidentiary
predicate" for applying the privilege.'o Because most of the issues
about which a corporation might want legal assistance would involve a
business purpose, this standard places a particularly onerous burden on
corporations. Other courts state that the privilege applies to corporate
communications with attorneys only if the attorney acts in his professional legal capacity and the communication is for the "express purpose
of securing legal advice." 5 '
Some courts' presumption of abuse is clear. A common statement is
that "corporate dealings are not made confidential merely by funnelling

146. Critics argue that the cost of the privilege in the corporate context is great because
accessing the information from other sources will be costly. In addition, access may be
impossible because of the evasiveness of a corporation. See generally James A. Gardner,
A PersonalPrivilege for Communicationsof CorporateClients-Paradoxor Public Policy?,
40 U. DET. L.J. 299 (1963); David Simon, supra note 42. See also supra notes 42-43 and
accompanying text.
147. 632 So. 2d 1377 (Fla. 1994).
148. Id. at 1383.
149. 132 F.R.D. 234 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
150. Id. at 238.

151. Avianca, Inc. v. Corriea, 705 F. Supp. 666, 676 (D.D.C. 1989). See also Teltron,
Inc. v. Alexander, 132 F.R.D. 394, 394 (E.D. Pa. 1990); SEC v. Gulf& Western Indus., Inc.,
518 F. Supp. 675, 681-83 (D.D.C. 1981). In Aamco Transmissions, Inc. v. Marino, Civ. A.
Nos. 88-5522, 88-6197, 1991 WL 193502, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 1991), the court stated
that the corporation "must clearly demonstrate that the communication in question was

made for the express purpose of securing legal not business advice."

1997]

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

1205

them routinely through an attorney."152 Although certainly true, this
statement and others like it appear in cases in which there is no
evidence of "funnelling."153
Not all courts exhibit explicit or even implicit bias.M Are the courts
that do show bias correct in looking askance at corporations claiming the
attorney-client privilege? Alexander's empirical study of the corporate
attorney-client privilege in New York City suggests that corporations do
not send documents to attorneys in an attempt to cloak the documents
with the privilege. Three-fourths of the attorneys said corporate clients
had never done so and most of the remaining one-fourth said that clients
"rarely" did so.' Alexander reported that most of the attorneys in the
latter group were "quick to add that they had disabused their clients of
the notion that privilege would apply.""~ Such answers, of course,
carry no particular indicia of reliability. With regard to a fear of lost
information in the corporate setting, Alexander's interviews with judges
and magistrates revealed that "application of the privilege to corporations usually causes no severe damage to the search for truth."157
Perhaps some courts simply do not fully appreciate the fact that the
privilege does not protect the underlying facts and does not protect
documents created for other purposes and then sent to counsel.15
With the balance struck and the privilege in place, a corporation's
consultation with a lawyer for the purpose of obtaining legal advice
enjoys the privilege. If the corporation consults with the attorney for the

152. Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 54 F.R.D. 44, 47 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Western
Trails, Inc. v. Camp Coast to Coast, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 4, 13 (D.D.C. 1991) (quoting Jack
Winter, 54 F.R.D. at 47). See also California Union Ins. Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co.,
No. 86-CV-609, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4996, at *4 (April 27, 1989) ("The corporate
attorney-client privilege is not available to allow a corporation to funnel its papers and
documents into the hands of its lawyers for custodial purposes and thereby avoid
disclosure."); SEC v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 518 F. Supp. 675, 681-82 (D.D.C. 1981)
("a corporate client should not be allowed to conceal a fact by disclosing it to the corporate
attorney").
153. See, e.g., Western Trails, Inc. v. Camp Coast to Coast, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 4, 13
(D.D.C. 1991).
154. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
155. Alexander, supra note 41, at 345. "The survey results suggest that a great deal
of business information indeed is exchanged between attorneys and clients in the corporate
context, but they contain little evidence of conscious attempts to create privilege for such
communications." Id. at 349-50.
156. Id. at 345.
157. Alexander, supra note 41, at 259-60.
158. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. See also Charles W. Wolfram, The
U.S. Law of Client Confidentiality: Framework for an International Perspective, 15
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 529 (1991-92) (the attorney-client privilege is not a black hole for
corporate documents, in part, because of preexisting document rule).
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purpose of obtaining legal advice about everything the corporation does,
then the privilege rightfully protects all of those communications. The
communications are rightfully within the "zone of silence." 9 The
facts, of course, are not. If the number of communications protected
becomes bothersome to society, that is, if the "zone of silence" seems too
broad, then jurisdictions should re-evaluate the calculus of benefits and
burdens of the application of the privilege to corporations. Courts should
not, however, apply a different analysis or hold a corporation's claim of
privilege more suspect on the basis of assumptions that the specific facts
of the case do not support.
B. Anti-In-House Counsel Bias
1. Evidence of Bias. Some commentators have argued that little
benefit accrues from applying the privilege to in-house counsel, yet much
is lost, so the privilege should not apply."6 These privilege opponents
base the lack of benefit argument on a belief that the privilege does not
encourage candor in the in-house counsel setting, or if it does, the
encouragement creates only small marginal benefit. In addition to the
hypothesis that the nature of organizational behavior subverts any
encouraging effect of the privilege, this argument postulates that a
corporation's need for legal advice, and its trust in the in-house counsel
as a loyal member of the corporate team, provides all the incentive
needed for complete candor. Thus, the privilege has little or no effect as
" ' With regard to the costs of having the privilege
a candor catalyst.16
apply to in-house counsel communications, these commentators see inhouse attorneys as players in the corporation-as-evil-doer theory. They
are the ones, it is argued, who make abuse of the privilege by corporations easy. They make spurious claims of the privilege for business
matters possible. 2 Several of these commentators view in-house

159. David Simon, supra note 42, at 955 ("Where corporations are involved, with their
large number of agents, masses of documents, and frequent dealings with lawyers, the zone
of silence grows large.").
160. Gardner, supra note 146, at 354-62; Sedler & Simeone, supra note 40, at 23-25;
David Simon, supra note 42, at 969-973; Note, supra note 42. See also Alexander, supra
note 41, at 276-86 (suggesting, but not advocating, differentiation for in-house counsel).
161. Alexander, supra note 41, at 276-84; Sedler & Simeone, supra note 40, at 25.
162. Alexander, supra note 41, at 195 ("The modern trend toward increased
participation of house counsel in the day-to-day affairs of large corporations makes the
prospect all the more likely."); David Simon, supra note 42, at 973 ("the relative ease with
which [in-house counsel] could be converted into a privileged sanctuary for corporate
records").
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counsel as being co-opted into the business culture, and thus as being
simply business advisors.8 3
Yet, just as courts and legislatures have decided that the attorneyclient privilege applies to corporations, courts have decided that the
privilege applies when the corporation's attorney is an in-house counsel.
The courts have weighed the benefits and burdens and have decided that
the privilege should apply; the benefits exceed the costs."
This
position accords with the traditional view in the United States that no
difference exists for professional or ethical purposes between an in-house
counsel and an outside counsel. 6 ' The case frequently quoted for its

163. Such ideas appear in articles from earlier times. They perhaps express a certain
view of in-house counsel, not generally shared in the 1990s, that in-house attorneys were
lesser attorneys. See, e.g., Note, supra note 42, at 246 (house counsel "often get so involved
with the commercial aspects of their employer's business that they cease to function as
attorneys"). For a clearer example of how other attorneys viewed in-house attorneys, see
H.J. Aibel, CorporateCounsel and Business Ethics: A PersonalReview, 59 MO. L. REV. 427
(1994), in which Aibel, chief legal officer of International Telephone & Telegraph, stated
that in the 1950s "the generally accepted wisdom [was] that jobs in corporate law
departments were for second raters, or lawyers who had failed to make partner at some
of the better firms." Id. at 427. Historically in-house attorneys perhaps did not receive
respect equal to law firm attorneys. See, e.g., Walter B. Davis, Reflections of a Kept
Lawyer, 53 A.B.A. J. 349 (1967) (noting "disapprobation" of bar for "kept" lawyers); Jeffrey
S. Slovak, The Ethics of CorporateLawyers: A SociologicalApproach, 1981 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 753,772, (1981) ("second class citizens"). See generallyRobert Eli Rosen, The Inside
Counsel Movement, ProfessionalJudgment and OrganizationalRepresentation,64 IND. L.J.
479 (1989).
164. See, e.g., Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394-95 (1981). See also United
States v. Rowe, 96 F.3d 1294, 1296 (9th Cir. 1996) (no difference between in-house counsel
and outside counsel when client is law firm); In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 99 (D.C. Cir.
1984); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 360 (D. Mass. 1950).
165. All ethical rules apply to all lawyers regardless of their status as litigators, outside
corporate counsel, or in-house counsel. See, e.g., In re Capps, 250 Ga. 242, 297 S.E,2d 249
(1982) (in-house attorney subject to discipline for ethical violation). See also Brian D.
Forrow, The CorporateLaw DepartmentLawyer: Counselto the Entity, 34 BUS. LAW. 1797,
1804 (1979). Occasionally this equal treatment leads to unfortunate results. For example,
some courts have held that an in-house attorney discharged for inappropriate reasons has
no cause of action for the wrongful discharge because the traditional rule for all attorneys
is that the client can discharge the attorney for any reason. See, e.g., Herbster v. North
Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343 (1ll. App. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850
(1987). The error of such a holding seems manifest. For discussion of the in-house counsel
discharge issue, see Grace M. Giesel, The Ethics or Employment Dilemma of In-House
Counsel, 5 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 535 (1992). Occasionally, courts treat in-house attorneys
differently for other purposes. See Louis S. Sorell, In-House Counsel Access to Confidential
InformationProducedDuringDiscovery in IntellectualPropertyLitigation,27 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 657 (1994) (discussing limits on in-house counsel access imposed by some courts).
In-house attorneys do not enjoy the privilege in some countries. See Alison M. Hill, Note,
A Problem of Privilege: In-House Counsel and the Attorney-Client Privilege in the United
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description of the attorney-client privilege, United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp.,
also eloquently addresses the in-house counsel
issue. In United Shoe the court held that courts should treat in-house
counsel like outside attorneys for privilege purposes, for the only real
difference between outside and in-house counsel is that "house counsel
gives advice to one regular client, the outside counsel to several regular
clients." 7 Clearly, in-house counsel should not receive different
treatment because of their status as in-house attorneys.
Some courts, however, continue to cast a distrustful eye at in-house
counsel. In particular situations, this distrust may derive wholly from
the distrust felt for corporations and may be motivated by assumptions
that corporations will seek to abuse the privilege. In other cases the
distrustful eye may result from a distrust of corporations accentuated by
the involvement of an in-house attorney. These courts seem to assume
that in-house counsel will act to abuse the privilege and also that inhouse attorneys do not render legal assistance. The language of United
States v. Davis'6 expresses the wariness. The United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, in reviewing claims
involving in-house counsel who was involved in a negotiation process,
stated that it had "carefully scrutinized each document ...in order to
ensure that 'in house counsel's law degree and office are169 not ...used to
create a "privileged sanctuary for corporate records."'"
Even without a presumption of intentional abuse, many courts seem
to treat in-house attorneys differently because they assume that in-house
counsel do a substantial amount of nonlegal work for the corporation and
that outside counsel do not render traditionally nonlegal services. On
the basis of these assumptions, courts require corporations claiming the

States and the European Community, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 145 (1995). See also
A.M. & S. Europe Ltd. v.Commission, 1982 E.C.J. 1575.
166. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
167. Id. at 360. See also Barr Marine Prods. Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 84 F.R.D. 631,
635-36 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (quoting United Shoe, 89 F. Supp. at 360, in applying privilege to
in-house attorney communications).
168. 132 F.R.D. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). See also Abel v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 91 Civ.
9261 (RPP) 1993 WL 33348, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1993) ("A corporation may not insulate
itself from suit for civil rights violations by funneling all data ... to in-house counsel,
eliminating the underlying records, and then claiming that the data in the in-house
counsels file is privileged.").
169. 132 F.R.D. at 16 (quoting United States v. Davis, 131 F.R.D. 391, 401 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (quoting Research Inst. for Medicine & Chemistry, Inc. v. Wisconsin Alumni
Research Found., 114 F.R.D. 672, 676 (W.D. Wisc. 1987))). See also SCM Corp. v. Xerox
Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 515 (D. Conn. 1976) ("Legal departments are not citadels in which
public, business or technical information may be placed to defeat discovery and thereby
ensure confidentiality.").
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privilege to overcome an assumption that the communication in question
does not relate to legal advice, services, or assistance. For example, in
Avianca, Inc. v. Correia,7 ° the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia stated:
Where the communication is with in-house counsel for a corporation,
particularly where that counsel also serves a business function, the
corporation must clearly demonstrate that the advice to be protected
was given "in a professional legal capacity" .

. .

. This limitation is

necessary to prevent corporations from shielding their business
transactions from discovery simply by funnelling their communications
through a licensed attorney.'
In Rossi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,'72 the Court of Appeals of New
York stated:
staff attorneys may serve as company officers with mixed businesslegal responsibility; whether or not officers, their day-to-day involvement may blur the line between legal and nonlegal communications;
and their advice may originate not in response to the client's consultation about a particular problem but with them, as part of an ongoing,
permanent relationship with the organization. In that the privilege
obstructs the truth-finding process and its scope is limited to that
which is necessary to achieve its purpose ... the need to apply it

cautiously and narrowly is heightened in the case of corporate staff
counsel, lest the mere participation of an attorney be used to seal off
disclosure.'73
In so stating, the court evaluated a memorandum from an in-house
attorney with no other corporate "role" to an officer of the corporation. 74 Requiring the document to be "primarily or predominantly of
a legal character," the court found that the privilege applied to the
document in spite of the above quoted statement.'75 The New York
court then stated: "While we are mindful of the concern that mere
participation of staff counsel not be used to seal off discovery of corporate

170. 705 F. Supp. 666 (D.D.C. 1989).
171. Id. at 676 (citation omitted) (The court then referenced the David Simon article
which warned of the "zones of silence"). See David Simon, supra note 42. See also Teltron,
Inc. v. Alexander, 132 F.R.D. 394, 396 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (quoting Avianca, 705 F. Supp. at
676); United States Postal Serv. v. Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp., 852 F. Supp. 156, 163-64
(E.D.N.Y. 1994) ("a corporation cannot be permitted to insulate its files from discovery
simply by sending a 'cc' to in-house counsel").
172. 540 N.E.2d 703 (N.Y. 1989).
173. Id. at 705 (citations omitted).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 706.
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communications, here '[njothing suggests that this is a situation where
a document was passed on to a defendant's attorney in order to avoid its
disclosure.'"' 76
Other courts regularly adopt this increased wariness of in-house
attorneys and apply this heightened scrutiny to privilege questions
involving such attorneys.177 For example, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Kramer v. The
Raymond Corp.,17 stated:
Because of the resulting obstruction to the truth-finding process,
however, the attorney-client privilege is construed narrowly .... This
is especially so when a corporate entity seeks to invoke the privilege to
protect communications to in-house counsel. Because in-house counsel
may play a dual role of legal advisor and business advisor, the privilege
will apply only if the communication's primary purpose is to gain or
provide legal assistance .

. .

. Rather, the corporation "must clearly

demonstrate that the communication in question was made for the
express purpose of securing legal not business advice." 179
Several courts applying this heightened level of scrutiny have clarified
that it does not apply to outside counsel. In United States v. Chev8 the United States District Court for the Northern District of
ron,"
California was reviewing a decision of a magistrate who had reviewed
documents involving in-house counsel.1 8 ' The magistrate had applied
a presumption of privilege. The District Court found fault with this
approach, stating:
Some courts have applied a presumption that all communications to
outside counsel are primarily related to legal advice . ...

In this

context, the presumption is logical since outside counsel would not
ordinarily be involved in the business decisions of a corporation.
However, the... presumption cannot be applied to in-house counsel
because in-house counsel are frequently involved in the business
decisions of a company

....

[A] corporation must make a clear

176. Id. (quoting Rossi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 528 N.Y.S.2d 51,52 (N.Y. App. Div.
1988)).
177. See, e.g., Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. GAF Roofing Mfg. Corp., No. 93 Civ. 5125 (RPP),
1996 WL 29392, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 1996) (quoting Rossi, 540 N.E.2d at 705); Abel v.

Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 91 Civ. 6261 (RPP), 1993 WL 33348 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1993).
178. Civ. No. 90-5026, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7418 (E.D. Pa. May 26, 1992).
179. Id. at *34 (citations omitted) (quoting Aamco Transmissions, Inc. v. Marino, Civil
Action Nos. 88-5522, 88-6197, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13326, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23,
1991)).
180. No. C-94-1885 SBA, 1996 WL 264769 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 1996).
181. Id. at *1.
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showing that in-house counsel's advice was given in a professional legal
capacity 82
On the basis of the assumption that in-house attorneys provide
substantial nonlegal services to the corporate client and that outside
attorneys do not, these courts apply a more strenuous analysis to the
claim of privilege. Courts do so without referring first to whether the
facts of the particular cases before them merit such assumptions. The
assumption of abuse appears to be unsubstantiated and odd. The courts'
assumptions that in-house attorneys render nonlegal services and
outside attorneys do not are likewise unsubstantiated.
Alexander's
study of New York executives, law firm partners, in-house counsel, and
the judiciary reveals that outside attorneys give business advice at about
the same frequency as do in-house attorneys who have no official
nonlegal responsibilities. The study found no statistically significant
difference between in-house and outside counsel regarding the frequency
with which they give business advice. In fact, 47.8% of outside counsel
and 46.7% of in-house attorneys said they give business advice
frequently."s
There is no doubt that in-house attorneys do render
nonlegal services to some extent.1" There is also no doubt that outside
attorneys do as well. One outside attorney in Alexander's study said,
8 5
"My clients expect me to serve as a perceptive businessman.""
Another outside attorney commented, "About 95%of what I do in putting
a deal together for a corporate client is business in nature."' ss The
corporate executives interviewed said they wanted that assistance.8 7
Reports of outside attorneys rendering more than traditional legal
assistance abound."'
At the very least, any assumption that outside attorneys do not give
business advice, and therefore, communications involving them deserve
a lesser level of scrutiny than in-house counsel communications, seems
flawed. Courts should evaluate in-house and outside counsel by the

182. Id. at *4.
183. Alexander, supra note 41, at 341-42 (reporting that 37.0% of outside counsel said
that they did so occasionally; 48.9% of in-house attorneys said they did occasionally; 15.2%
of outside attorneys said that they did rarely; and 4.4% of in-house attorneys responded
in this way).
184. See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting,supra note 3, at 16 (legal department is part of
management team running business on a day-to-day basis).
185. Alexander, supra note 41, at 339.
186. Id. at 342.
187. Seventy-eight point eight percent of the executives said they wanted such advice.
Alexander, supra note 41, at 340-41 ("We want legal advice tempered by practical business
considerations.).
188. See, e.g., Woolsey, supra note 106, at 14. See also Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 18.
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same standard and same level of scrutiny. It is illogical to differentiate
between in-house and outside attorneys on the basis of false assumptions. A court should evaluate each case before it and decide the
privilege not on the basis of assumptions, but on the basis of the facts.
To the extent lesser scrutiny or even a presumption of privilege has
applied to outside counsel communications, it should no longer.
In situations in which the in-house attorney has an official nonlegal
role in addition to a legal one, a court can assume that some of the
communications with that attorney do not relate to the legal representation. Yet, outside counsel have dual roles 8 9 just as in-house attorneys
do," so any assumption based on dual roles limited to in-house
attorneys is unsupportable. Even with regard to in-house counsel with
a management or other nonlegal role, the assumption that some of the
attorney's communications do not relate to legal advice, service, or
assistance cannot be the basis of a decision. To do so is to decide on the
basis of probability, not fact. In Fine v. Facet Aerospace Products
Co.,' 9' the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York stated that the fact that the in-house counsel also acted as an
assistant secretary of the corporation "thus increas[ed] the probability
that the communications were made for general business purposes. [The
attorney's] averment that he provided legal advice in connection with the
report is entirely conclusory." '9 In evaluating communications with
a general counsel who also acted as a vice president of the corporation,
then Judge Ginsburg in In re Sealed Case,' noted that given this
status, "[t]he Company can shelter [the attorney's] advice only upon a
clear showing that [the attorney] gave it in a professional legal
capacity.""9 In this dual role situation, it seems proper to require the

189.
190.

See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.

191. 133 F.R.D. 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
192. Id. at 444. In contrast, see Cuno, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 121 F.R.D. 198,202 (E.D.N.Y.
1988), where the court accepted the affidavits of counsel involved which stated that the
engineering department, by the submission of technical information to the attorney, sought

legal advice even though the documents on their face did not suggest this purpose.
193. 737 F.2d 94 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
194. Id. at 99. See also Hardy v. New York News, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633, 644 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (in-house counsel and Vice President & Director of Employee Relations--corporation
failed to establish that the attorney was acting as "legal advisor to the corporation as
opposed to Director of Employee or Labor Relations"); North Carolina Elec. Membership
Corp. v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 110 F.R.D. 511, 517 (M.D.N.C. 1986) ("Several of [the

corporation's] house counsel also performed duties outside the legal department. Thus,
defendant bore a burden to show that advice was given in a legal, rather than business,
capacity."); Barr Marine Prods. Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 84 F.R.D. 631, 637 (E.D. Pa.
1979) (general counsel and Senior Vice President did not prove role).
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corporation to meet its burden of proof, something made more difficult
by the dual roles. It does not seem logical to impose a higher standard
of proof or to scrutinize the corporation's claim more carefully in this
situation simply on the basis of a probability. Many in society may
think-the fact that a criminal defendant committed a crime in the past
makes his guilt to the later charge more likely. Yet, our law does not
apply a different standard of proof or scrutiny to that defendant in the
later case.
The following scenario noted in the legal press makes the faults of the
approach taken by these courts particularly clear. A corporation uses an
outside law firm as its legal department. The company and law firm are
in the same building and share the same electronic mail system. A
partner in the firm is the corporation's general counsel and corporate
secretary. The law firm monitors work sent to other firms and renders
a variety of services itself. Yet, the general counsel claims that his firm
can create an attorney-client privilege situation but an in-house attorney
could not. 9 ' Courts that apply a heightened scrutiny analysis to inhouse counsel situations indeed might find no privilege for in-house
counsel communications while finding privilege for the same communication with lawyers in this firm or even the general counsel himself. The
general counsel's outside status may, in the court's eyes, be proof of the
applicability of the privilege. Such a result hardly comports with notions
of fairness and justice. Each communication and each situation must be
considered separately.
Certainly not all opinions reveal anti-in-house counsel bias. Upjohn
itself involved communications with inrhouse and outside attorneys and
In Motley v. Marathon Oil
not a whisper of bias presents itself."
Co., 9 the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
evaluated two documents: a draft memorandum authored by in-house
counsel regarding proposed guidelines for employee terminations, and a
document prepared by management.' 98 After affirming that the
corporation had the burden of proving that the privilege applied, the
court relied on the in-house counsel's affidavit that the memorandum
contained legal advice, not business advice, and that the managementprepared document was done at the behest of the attorney and was
created for the attorney's use in rendering legal advice. Noting that the
opposition had presented no evidence "directly contradicting" the

195. See Rubenstein, supra note 6, at 18.
196. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). See also Diversey U.S.
Holdings, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., No. 91 C 6234, 1994 WL 71462 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 1994).
197. 71 F.3d 1547 (10th Cir. 1995).
198. Id. at 1550.
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affidavit, the court affirmed the lower court's application of the
privilege.'" The court applied no assumptions and seemed to analyze
the application of the privilege simply on the basis of whether the facts
before it merited application of the privilege.
Several courts have noted that the facts before them do not suggest
bad faith. Thus, these courts have not inferred bad faith, or a high
probability thereof, from the participation of in-house counsel. For
example, in Natta v. Hogan,2"° the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit, in reviewing communications involving in-house
counsel, stated that the record did not indicate that the corporation
"channeled any papers into the hands of its lawyers for custodial
purposes to avoid disclosure."2"' And in United States v. Lipshy, °2
in reviewing communications involving a person who was an officer,
general counsel, and director, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas accepted the attorney's testimony that he
acted as an attorney regarding the communication, stating, "I find no
reason to doubt his good faith in making these statements." 203
2. In Contrast: The Patent Counsel Experience. Although some
courts have treated the group differently on the basis of assumptions
about the group as a whole, quite the reverse has occurred with courts'
treatment of patent attorneys. At one time courts commonly held that
the attorney-client privilege did not apply to much of the technical or
scientific information communicated between clients and their patent
attorneys because the patent attorney acted as the "mere conduit of
factual and technical information."2" The majority of courts have now
rejected such a narrow view based on a narrow assumption of the patent
attorney role. 5 These courts now analyze patent attorney communications as they do any other attorney communications. Courts focus now

199. Id. at 1551. In Shell Oil Co. v. Par Four Partnership, 638 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1994), the Florida court applied the privilege to communications involving inhouse counsel, stating that if communications "appear on their face to be privileged, the
party seeking disclosure bears the burden of proving that they are not." Id. at 1050.
200. 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968).
201. Id. at 692.
202. 492 F. Supp. 35 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
203. Id. at 42. See also supra note 176 and accompanying text.
204. Laitram Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 827 F. Supp. 1242, 1243 (E.D. La. 1993).
See also Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 54 F.R.D. 44 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954).
205. In Fromson v. Anitec Printing Plates, Inc., 152 F.R.D. 2 (D. Mass. 1993), the court
noted the two approaches taken by courts and concluded that the majority of courts now
use the more expansive approach in evaluating the application of the attorney-client
privilege to patent attorneys. Id. at 3.
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on the client's purpose of obtaining legal advice regardless of the
technical nature of much of the communications. 2 The United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts, in Fromson v. Anitec
PrintingPlates, Inc.,"27 stated: "The rendering of legal advice regarding the patentability is a quintessential role for lawyers; the sanctity of
communications in this context are entitled to no less protection than
other attorney/client communications .... ,208
Another court, in adopting the enlightened approach, stated:
The inventor usually brings to the dialogue little reliable legal knowledge but much technical information about the product or process and
some information about prior art. The lawyer brings to the dialogue
an understanding of ... the criteria used by the PTO [Patent and
Trademark Office] in deciding whether to issue patents and of the legal
principles or considerations that come into play when parties seek to
enforce a patent against an alleged infringer or to challenge a patent's
validity. In their private dialogue, inventor and lawyer attempt, as a
team, to make judgments that are subtle and have real legal dimensions and implications.2

9

the
The court stated that the broader view was "more consistent with
210
relationship."
attorney-client
patent
the
of
realities
professional
This approach to evaluating patent attorneys contrasts starkly to the
treatment of in-house counsel by some courts. Although courts have
recognized the impropriety of basing privilege decisions on assumptions
about patent attorney work and communications, other courts have
continued to do so when the attorney is an in-house counsel, whether or
not that attorney has official nonlegal responsibilities.

206. See, e.g., Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 148 F.R.D. 535 (E.D.N.C. 1993); Stryker
Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 145 F.R.D. 298 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Advanced
Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 144 F.R.D. 372 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Cuno, Inc. v.
Pall Corp., 121 F.R.D. 198,201-02 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Minnesota Mining& Mfg. Co. v. Ampad
Corp., No. 85-0457-F, 1987 WL 124334 (D. Mass. May 14, 1987); Knogo Corp. v. United
States, 213 U.S.P.Q. 936 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
207. 152 F.R.D. 2 (D. Mass. 1993).
208. Id. at 4 (quoting Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Ampad Corp., No. 85-0457-F,
1987 WL 124334 (D. Mass. May 14, 1987)). See also Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 148
F.R.D. 535,540 (E.D.N.C. 1993 ) ("The patent attorney is not simply a conduit between the
client and the Patent Office; he or she also serves as a filter straining out that which must
be included in patent prosecution documents from that which may be held back.").
209. Laitram Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 827 F. Supp. 1242, 1245 (E.D. La. 1993)
(quoting Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 144 F.R.D. 372, 375-376
(N.D. Cal. 1992)).
210. Laitram Corp., 827 F. Supp. at 1246.
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A Better Approach: Eliminate Bias Based on Assumptions
With regard to corporations in general, courts should not assume that
abuse of the privilege is occurring in particular cases and should not
assume that communications involving attorneys relate to or do not
relate to legal advice, service, or assistance. Such assumptions are, at
best, based on speculation and guessed probabilities. Courts should
require all types of privilege claimants to prove that the privilege
applies. Because of the nature of corporations, they may find doing so
more difficult. A different standard of proof, however, seems inappropriate absent specific evidence of abuse or specific evidence of inapplicability of the privilege.
In addition, courts should treat in-house attorneys and outside
attorneys the same for purposes of the attorney-client privilege. Inhouse counsel and outside counsel are subject to the same ethical rules,
trained in the same law school classes, and in many cases gain
experience in the same law firms. There is no reason to assume that inhouse counsel, but not outside counsel, will behave unethically or seek
to abuse an evidentiary privilege. Further, there is no reason to assume
or even to think it probable for any one communication involving an inhouse attorney who has no official nonlegal responsibilities that the
communication is nonlegal in nature. In-house attorneys render all sorts
of legal and business advice-and so do outside attorneys. Claims of
privilege involving both types of attorneys should be carefully proved
and carefully evaluated by a court. Lastly, even claims of privilege
relating to an in-house attorney with substantial nonlegal responsibilities should not be confronted with assumptions based on the assumed
probability that the communication in question is nonlegal in nature.
Again, courts should require proof by the claimant that the communication in issue deserves the privilege.
The result may be that communications with outside counsel are
evaluated with a more careful eye, not that communications with inhouse counsel are subject to less scrutiny. Corporations may find such
claims difficult to prove; yet, the courts should not require the claimant
to do more or less than proving privilege applicability. As courts now
evaluate communications involving patent attorneys on the basis of the
communications and the clients' and attorneys' motivations, not on the
basis of status-based assumptions, so too courts should evaluate in-house
counsel on the basis of the communications at issue and the motivations
for those communications. Privilege should not be a probabilities game.
The elimination of bias should improve the certainty quotient of the
privilege. Any standard that requires communication-by-communication
evaluation allows for a substantial lack of certainty at the time of a
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communication that a court will later deem the communication
privileged. Yet, the situation is improved if, at the time of the communication, the standard of proof and evaluation is clear, uniform, and
rational.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The attorney-client privilege, to achieve its stated goal of increased
client candor with attorneys, must carry with it a measure of certainty.
Unfortunately, the requirement that the communication relate to legal
advice, service, or assistance, sometimes coupled with an allegedly
separate requirement that the attorney act in a professional legal
capacity, has resulted in a muddle of decisions which has in turn created
a sea of uncertainty and a significant degree of injustice, especially for
corporate claimants.
Major sources of the uncertainty include a lack of understanding or
agreement in the courts about what kinds of activities might be
considered privileged. Also, some courts evaluate activities and
professional legal capacity on the basis of traditional or historical
functions of attorneys, though attorneys commonly apply their legal
expertise, education, and training in nontraditional settings. Other
courts do not so limit the analysis. Most courts agree that the privilege
should apply as long as the legal essence is primary, yet some courts
focus on whether the client primarily sought legal advice, service, or
assistance in communicating, while others focus on whether the
communication itself constituted primarily legal advice, service, or
assistance. Any such standard is inherently subjective and in addition
problematic because any determination usually results from an in
camera review of documents.
Into this confusion has crept a bias against corporations, and
specifically, against in-house counsel. Though courts admit that the
privilege applies in these settings, some courts assume that corporations
and in-house attorneys abuse the privilege. In addition, some courts
make unsubstantiated assumptions about the type of services corporations request and that their attorneys, in-house and outside, render.
These courts subject corporate claimants of the privilege to a stricter
scrutiny than they would apply if the communication involved no
corporation and especially no in-house attorneys. Courts have relied on
assumptions based on supposed probabilities in erecting hurdles for
corporate claimants to overcome. Other courts accept the balance struck
by the policy decision to apply the privilege to corporations and in-house
counsel. Because of the mixed message these two divergent treatments
of corporations and in-house counsel convey to the prospective corporate
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speaker, there is less certainty surrounding the privilege for corporations.
Achieving clarity in this area of privilege law is elusive and may be
impossible. Courts can act to improve the situation. First, courts should
abandon attempting to define the type of lawyer activity protected by
some notion of traditional lawyer functions. The practice of law does not
remain static and courts should recognize this fact while keeping the
rationale of the privilege in the forefront of the analysis. A focus on a
client's desire to access the lawyer's particular skill and training seems
appropriate.
Second, courts should forego a professional legal capacity analysis. In
the corporate sphere, in the vast majority of situations, no capacity
analysis can occur without resort to a consideration of the nature of the
particular communication. Evaluating capacity in the abstract is
impossible because attorneys do not truly change hats when rendering
different types of services. Capacity decisions based on assumptions
about tasks done by in-house or outside counsel are indefensible. To the
extent that the evaluation of capacity involves evaluation of the
particular communication, the analysis repeats the analysis of whether
the client sought, or the attorney rendered, legal advice, service, or
assistance. Such analysis adds nothing but confusion. Many courts
have not analyzed capacity separately. All courts should follow their
lead.
Third, courts should attempt to state and apply standards of
evaluation more consistently in all situations. Lastly, courts should
require all claimants, individual and corporate, to shoulder the same
burden of proof subject to the same level of scrutiny in proving that a
particular communication deserves the protection of the privilege.
Likewise, claims of privilege involving in-house counsel should receive
the same treatment as claims of outside counsel.
An increased fairness and an increased certainty in the application of
the attorney-client privilege in the corporate environment should result.
With such improvement, the attorney-client privilege can perhaps
encourage client candor. Without improvement, the privilege risks being
only a mass of confusion providing fertile ground for expensive corollary
litigation.

